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UNTRANSLATED FREUD

[EDITORIAL NOTE: *Under this heading we are publishing selections from Freud's writings which, so far as we can discover, have not yet appeared in English.*]

(4) A DISTURBANCE OF MEMORY ON THE ACROPOLIS

AN OPEN LETTER TO ROMAIN ROLLAND ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY (1936) [1]

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I have been urgently pressed to make some written contribution to the celebration of your seventieth birthday and I have made long efforts to find something that might in some sense be worthy of you and might give expression to my admiration for your love of the truth, for your courage in your beliefs and for your affection and devotion towards humanity; or, again, something that might bear witness to my gratitude towards you as a writer who has afforded me so many moments of exaltation and pleasure. But it was in vain. I am ten years older than you and my powers of production are at an end. All that I can find to offer you is the gift of an impoverished being, who has ' seen better days '.

You know that the aim of my scientific work was to throw light upon unusual, abnormal or pathological manifestations of the mind —that is to say, to trace them back to the psychological forces operating behind them and to indicate the mechanisms at work. I began by attempting this upon myself and then went on to apply it to other people and finally, by a bold extension, to the human race as a whole. During the last few years, a phenomenon of this sort, which I myself had experienced a generation ago, in 1904, and which I had never

[1] [' Brief an Romain Rolland (Eine Erinnerungsstörung auf der Acropolis) ' was published in German in the *Almanach der Psychoanalyse, 1937*, 9–21.—ED.]

understood, has kept on recurring to my mind. I did not at first see why; but at last I determined to analyse the incident—and I now present you with the results of that inquiry. In the process, I shall have, of course, to ask you to give more attention to some events in my private life than they would otherwise deserve.

Every year, at that time, towards the end of August or the beginning of September, I used to set out with my younger brother on a holiday trip, which used to last for some weeks and used to take us to Rome or to some other region of Italy or to some part of the Mediterranean sea-board. My brother is ten years younger than I am, so he is the same age as you—a coincidence which has only now occurred to me. In that particular year my brother told me that his business affairs would not allow him to be away for long: a week would be the most that he could manage and we should have to shorten our trip. So we decided to travel by way of Trieste to the island of Corfu and there spend the few days of our holiday. At Trieste he called upon a business acquaintance who lived there, and I went with him. Our host inquired in a friendly way about our plans and, hearing that it was our intention to go to Corfu, advised us strongly against it: 'What makes you think of going there at this time of year? It would be too hot for you to do anything. You had far better go to Athens instead. The Lloyd boat sails this afternoon; it will give you three days there to see the town and will pick you up on its return voyage. That would be more agreeable and more worth while.'

As we walked away from this visit, we were both in remarkably depressed spirits. We discussed the plan that had been proposed, agreed that it was quite impracticable and saw nothing but difficulties in the way of carrying it out; we assumed, moreover, that we should not be allowed to land in Greece without passports. We spent the hours that elapsed before the Lloyd offices opened in wandering about the town in a discontented and irresolute frame of mind. But when the time came, we went up to the counter and booked our passages for Athens as though it were a matter of course, without bothering in the least about the supposed difficulties and indeed without having discussed with one another the reasons for our decision. Such behaviour, it must be confessed, was most strange. Later on we recognized that we had accepted the suggestion that we should go to Athens instead of Corfu instantly and most readily. But, if so, why had we spent the interval before the offices opened in such a gloomy state and foreseen nothing but obstacles and difficulties?

When, finally, on the afternoon after our arrival, I stood upon the Acropolis and cast my eyes around upon the landscape, a remarkable thought suddenly entered my mind: 'So all this really *does* exist, just as we learnt at school!' To describe the situation more accurately, the person who gave expression to the remark was divided, far more sharply than was usually observable, from another person who took cognizance of the remark; and both were astonished, though not by the same thing. The first behaved as though he were obliged, under the impact of an unequivocal observation, to believe in something the reality of which had hitherto seemed doubtful. If I may make a slight exaggeration, it was as if someone, walking beside Loch Ness, suddenly caught sight of the form of the famous Monster stranded upon the shore and found himself driven to the admission: 'So it really *does* exist—the sea-serpent we always disbelieved in!' The second person, on the other hand, was justifiably astonished, because he had been unaware that the real existence of Athens, the Acropolis and the landscape around it had ever been objects of doubt. What he had been expecting was rather some expression of delight or admiration.

Now it would be easy to argue that this strange thought that occurred to me on the Acropolis only serves to emphasize the fact that seeing something with one's own eyes is after all quite a different thing from hearing or reading about it. But even so it would remain a most remarkable disguise for an uninteresting commonplace. Or it would be possible to maintain that it was true that when I was a schoolboy I had *thought* I was convinced of the historic reality of the city of Athens and its history, but that the occurrence of this idea on the Acropolis had precisely shown that in my unconscious I had *not* believed in it, and that I was only now acquiring a conviction that 'reached down to the unconscious'. An explanation of this sort sounds very profound, but it is easier to assert than to prove; moreover, it is very much open to attack upon theoretical grounds. No. I believe that the two phenomena, the depression at Trieste and the idea on the Acropolis were intimately connected. And the first of these is more easily intelligible and may help us towards an explanation of the second.

The experience at Trieste was, it will be noticed, also no more than an expression of disbelief: 'We're going to see Athens? Out of the question!—it'll be far too difficult!' The accompanying depression corresponded to a regret that it *was* out of the question: it would have been so lovely. And now we know where we are. It is one of those

cases of ' too good to be true ' that we come across so often. It is an example of the scepticism that arises so often when we are surprised by a piece of good news, when we hear we have won a prize, for instance, or drawn a winner, or when a girl learns that the man whom she has secretly loved has asked her parents for leave to pay his addresses to her.

When we have established the existence of a phenomenon, the next question is of course as to its cause. Disbelief of this kind is obviously an attempt to repudiate a piece of reality ; but there is something strange about it. We should not be in the least astonished if an attempt of this kind were aimed at a piece of reality that threatened unpleasant consequences : the mechanism of our mind is, so to speak, planned to work along just such lines. But why should such disbelief arise in something which, on the contrary, promises to bring a high degree of pleasure ? Truly paradoxical behaviour ! But I recollect that on a previous occasion I dealt with the similar case of the people who, as I put it, are ' wrecked by success '. [2] As a rule people fall ill as a result of frustration, of the non-fulfilment of some vital necessity or desire. But with these people the opposite is the case ; they fall ill, or even go entirely to pieces, because an overwhelmingly powerful wish of theirs has been fulfilled. But the contrast between the two situations is not so great as it seems at first. What happens in the paradoxical case is merely that the place of the external frustration is taken by an internal one. The sufferer does not permit himself happiness : the internal frustration commands him to cling to the external one. But why ? Because—so runs the answer in a number of cases—one cannot expect fate to grant one anything so good. In fact, another instance of ' too good to be true ', the expression of a pessimism of which a large portion seems to find a home in many of us. In another set of cases, just as in those who are wrecked by success, we find a sense of guilt or inferiority, which can be translated : ' I'm not worthy of such happiness, I don't deserve it.' But these two motives are essentially the same, for one is only a projection of the other. For, as has long been known, the fate which we expect to treat us so badly is a materialization of our conscience, of the severe super-ego within us, itself a residue of the punitive function of our childhood.

This, I think, explains our behaviour in Trieste. We could not

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[2] [Cf. Freud, ' Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work ' (1915), *Coll. Papers*, IV, 323.—Ed.]

believe that we were to be given the joy of seeing Athens. The fact that the piece of reality that we were trying to repudiate was to begin with only a possibility determined the character of our immediate reactions. But when we were standing on the Acropolis the possibility had become an actuality, and the same disbelief found a different but far clearer expression. In an undistorted form this should have been: 'I really couldn't have imagined it possible that it would ever be granted me to see Athens with my own eyes—as is now indubitably the case!' When I recall the passionate desire to travel and see the world by which I was dominated at school and later, and how long it was before that desire began to find its fulfilment, I am not surprised at its after-effect on the Acropolis; I was then forty-eight years old. I did not ask my younger brother whether he felt anything of the same sort. A certain amount of awkwardness surrounded the whole episode; and it was this which had already interfered with our exchanging thoughts at Trieste.

If I have rightly guessed the meaning of the thought that came to me on the Acropolis and if it did in fact express my joyful astonishment at finding myself at that spot, the further question now arises why this meaning should have been subjected in the thought itself to such a distorted and distorting disguise.

The essential subject-matter of the thought, to be sure, was retained even in the distortion—that is, incredulity: 'By the evidence of my senses I am now standing on the Acropolis, but I cannot believe it.' This incredulity, however, this doubt of a piece of reality, was doubly displaced in its actual expression: first, it was shifted back into the past, and secondly it was transposed from my relation to the Acropolis on to the very existence of the Acropolis. And so something occurred which was equivalent to an assertion that at some time in the past I had doubted the real existence of the Acropolis—which, however, my memory rejected as being incorrect and, indeed, impossible.

The two distortions involve two independent problems. We can attempt to penetrate deeper into the process of transformation. Without for the moment particularizing as to how I have arrived at the idea, I will start from the presumption that the original factor must have been a sense of some feeling of the unbelievable and the unreal in the situation at the moment. The situation included myself, the Acropolis and my perception of it. I could not account for this doubt, I obviously could not attach the doubt to my sensory impressions of the Acropolis. But I remembered that in the past I had had a doubt

about something which had to do with this precise locality, and I thus found the means for shifting the doubt into the past. In the process, however, the subject-matter of the doubt was changed. I did not simply recollect that in my early years I had doubted whether I myself would ever see the Acropolis, but I asserted that at that time I had altogether disbelieved in the reality of the Acropolis. It is precisely this effect of the displacement that leads me to think that the actual situation on the Acropolis contained an element of doubt of reality. I have certainly not yet succeeded in making the process clear ; so I will conclude by saying briefly that the whole psychological situation, which seems so confused and is so difficult to describe, can be satisfactorily cleared up by assuming that at the time I had (or might have had) a momentary feeling : ' What I see here is not real.' Such a feeling is known as a ' feeling of derealization ' [' *Entfremdungsgefühl* '].[3] I made an attempt to ward that feeling off, and I succeeded, at the cost of making a false pronouncement about the past.

These derealizations are remarkable phenomena which are still little understood. They are spoken of as ' sensations ', but they are obviously complicated processes, attached to particular mental contents and bound up with decisions made about those contents. They arise very frequently in certain mental diseases, but they are not unknown among normal people, just as hallucinations occasionally occur in the healthy. Nevertheless they are certainly failures in functioning and, like dreams, which, in spite of their regular occurrence in healthy people, serve us as models of psychological disorder, they are abnormal structures. These phenomena are to be observed in two forms : the subject feels either that a piece of reality or that a piece of his own self is strange to him. In the latter case we speak of ' depersonalizations ' ; derealizations and depersonalizations are intimately connected. There is another set of phenomena which may be regarded as their positive counterparts—what are known as ' *fausse reconnaissance* ', ' *déjà vu* ', ' *déjà raconté* ', etc., illusions in which we seek to accept something as belonging to our ego, just as in the derealizations we are anxious to keep something out of us. A naïvely mystical and unpsychological attempt at explaining the phenomenon of ' *déjà vu* ' endeavours to find evidence in it of a former existence of

[3] [The word has been rendered variously into English. Henderson and Gillespie, *Text-book of Psychiatry* (Fifth Edition, 1940), 102, use the term ' derealization ', and make the same distinction as Freud between it and ' depersonalization '.—Ed.]

our mental self. Depersonalization leads us on to the extraordinary condition of '*double conscience*', which is more correctly described as 'split personality'. But all of this is so obscure and has been so little examined scientifically that I must refrain from talking about it any more to you.

It will be enough for my purposes if I return to two general characteristics of the phenomena of derealization. The first is that they all serve the purpose of defence; they aim at repudiating something, at keeping something away from the ego. Now, new elements, which may give occasion for defensive measures, approach the ego from two directions—from the real external world and from the internal world of thoughts and impulses that emerge in the ego. It is possible that this alternative coincides with the choice between derealizations proper and depersonalizations. There are an extraordinarily large number of methods (or mechanisms, as we say) used by our ego in the discharge of its defensive functions. An investigation is at this moment being carried on close at hand which is devoted to the study of these methods of defence: my daughter, the child analyst, is writing a book upon them.[4] The most primitive and thorough-going of these methods, 'repression', was the starting-point of the whole of our deeper understanding of psychopathology. Between repression and what may be termed the normal method of warding off what is painful or unbearable, by means of recognizing it, considering it, making a judgement upon it and taking appropriate action about it, there lie a whole series of more or less clearly pathological methods of behaviour on the part of the ego. May I stop for a moment to remind you of a marginal case of this kind of defence? You remember the famous lament of the Spanish Moors '*Ay de mi Alhama*' ['Alas for my Alhama'], which tells how King Boabdil received the news of the fall of his city of Alhama. He feels that this loss means the end of his rule. But he will not 'let it be true', he determines to treat the news as '*non arrivé*'. The verse runs:

> 'Cartas le fueron venidas
> que Alhama era ganada:
> las cartas echo en el fuego,
> y al mensajero matara.'[5]

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[4] [Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (1936; *Trans.* 1937).—Ed.]

[5] ['Letters had reached him telling that Alhama was taken. He threw the letters in the fire and killed the messenger.'—Ed.]

It is easy to guess that a further determinant of this behaviour of the king was his need to combat a feeling of powerlessness. By burning the letters and having the messenger killed he was trying to show that his power was still at its full.

The second general characteristic of the derealizations—their dependence upon the past, upon the ego's store of memories and upon earlier painful experiences which have since perhaps fallen victim to repression—is not accepted without dispute. But precisely my own experience on the Acropolis, which actually culminated in a disturbance of memory and a falsification of the past, helps us to demonstrate this connection. It is not true that in my school-days I ever doubted the real existence of Athens. I only doubted whether I should ever see Athens. It seemed to me beyond the realms of possibility that I should travel so far—that I should ' go such a long way '. This was linked up with the limitations and poverty of our conditions of life. My longing to travel was no doubt also the expression of a wish to escape from that pressure, like the force which drives so many adolescent children to run away from home. I had long seen clearly that a great part of the pleasure of travel lies in the fulfilment of these early wishes, that it is rooted, that is, in dissatisfaction with home and family. When first one catches sight of the sea, crosses the ocean and experiences as realities cities and lands which for so long had been distant, unattainable things of desire—one feels oneself like a hero who has performed deeds of improbable greatness. I might that day on the Acropolis have said to my brother : ' Do you still remember how, when we were young, we used day after day to walk along the same streets on our way to school, and how every Sunday we used to go to the Prater or on some excursion that we knew so well ? And now we are in Athens and are standing on the Acropolis ! We really *have* gone a long way ! ' So too, if I may compare such a small event with a greater one, Napoleon, during his coronation as Emperor in Notre Dame, turned to one of his brothers—it must no doubt have been the eldest one, Joseph—and remarked : ' What would *Monsieur notre Père* have said to this, if he could have been here to-day ? '

But here we come upon the solution of the little problem of why it was that already at Trieste we interfered with our enjoyment of the voyage to Athens. It must be that a sense of guilt was attached to the satisfaction in having got so far : there was something about it that was wrong, that was from earliest times forbidden. It was something to do with the child's criticism of his father, with the underestimation

which took the place of the overestimation of earlier childhood. It seems as though the essence of success were to have got further than one's father, and as though to excel one's father were still something forbidden.

As an addition to this generally valid motive there was a special factor present in our particular case. The very theme of Athens and the Acropolis in itself contained evidence of the sons' superiority. Our father had been in business, he had had no secondary education, and Athens could not have meant much to him. Thus what interfered with our enjoyment of the journey to Athens was a feeling of *piety*. And now you will no longer wonder that the recollection of this incident on the Acropolis should have troubled me so often since I myself have grown old and stand in need of forbearance and can travel no more.

I am ever sincerely yours,

SIGM. FREUD.

ORIGINAL PAPERS

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS OF THE THEORY OF THE INSTINCTS[1]

BY

EDWARD BIBRING

BOSTON

The following pages set out to give a short and simplified survey of the development of the psycho-analytical theory of the instincts. It is based essentially upon the works of Freud, since, however tempting it may be to take into account the whole of the psycho-analytical literature on the subject, to do so would complicate our exposition too much. . . . The survey follows a chronological order (except in one place, in connection with the fourth step in the history of the theory) but naturally this does not apply to the detailed discussion of certain points.

Before embarking on my actual theme, let me say a few words about the subdivision of the branch of knowledge of which the theory of the instincts is only a part. The psycho-analytical study of the instincts is made up of two main parts, a general theory of the instincts and a specialized one. The general theory includes, besides the *concept* of instinct, the theory of the instincts in the narrower sense, that is, the question of the number and nature of the instincts, the question of the criteria of their classification, and the question of their causation and function; the general theory further includes the theory of instinctual transformation, i.e. the question of the variability of instincts and the laws which such variations (which are in part the

[1] [Though this paper was published in German some years ago, it seems desirable that it should appear in an English translation, since it presents what is perhaps the clearest and most authoritative account of the various phases of Freud's views upon the instincts. It was based upon two lectures given before the Prague Psycho-Analytical Study Group in November, 1934, and first appeared in *Imago* (1936), **22**, 147. A few passages dealing with the views of writers other than Freud have been omitted from the present version. The proposal to make some such omissions was put forward in the first instance by the author himself. Owing to war conditions, however, it has not been possible to obtain his approval in detail of the omissions actually made, for which, accordingly, the Editor is wholly responsible. They do not, in any case, interrupt the main thread of the paper and the points at which they occur have all been indicated in the text.—ED.]

same as what are called instinctual vicissitudes) obey; and it includes, finally, the concepts and problems connected with the energic aspect of the instincts. The specialized theory is concerned with the development of the instincts in the individual, together with the working hypotheses which that development entails and the problems to which it gives rise.

In the following pages I shall confine myself to the general theory and in particular to that part of it which is devoted to the theory of the instincts in the narrower sense. This field, too, has been the main subject of psycho-analytical discussions upon the instincts, during the last few years.

Let us begin, for the sake of clarity, with a short sketch of the history of instinctual theory. A theory of the instincts can be monistic, dualistic or pluralistic. . . . Freud's theory was a dualistic one from the beginning, and it remained so, in spite of all the changes that it underwent. What was changed was never the *number* but only the nature of the instincts, or rather the groups of instincts, that were to be distinguished.

The theory of the instincts reached its present position in four steps.

(1) The first step was the setting up of two groups of instincts—the sexual and the ego instincts. The sexual instincts were closely studied, whereas the ego instincts remained to begin with a relatively unknown quantity.

(2) The second step was an addition to the theory. The introduction of the concept of narcissism into the libido theory led to the postulation of a libidinal component of the ego instincts. Nevertheless Freud held firmly to the view that besides this libidinal component there must exist a primary, non-libidinal component; this he called 'interest' in a non-committal way, rather in the sense of non-libidinal egoism.

(3) The third step—a step which has for the most part been overlooked in psycho-analytical writings—was that the aggressive trends were ascribed to the ego instincts as being among their essential constituents. This view was set out by Freud in the last sections of his paper on 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1) and was based upon a discussion of the relation between love and hate, in which he came to the conclusion that hate was to be regarded as a non-libidinal reaction of the ego.

(4) The fourth step was due to a growing knowledge of the structure of the mental apparatus as a whole and its division into a 'vital' stratum (the id) and an organized part (the ego), and, more especially, to a study of the unconscious region of the ego, the super-ego. The gist of this view was that the aggressive trends were no longer regarded as primary attributes of the ego instincts but as independently existent instincts of aggression and destruction existing side by side with the sexual instincts in the vital strata of the mind. The ego instincts ceased to be independent entities and were derived partly from the libidinal and partly from the aggressive instincts.

To this fourth step in the development of instinctual theory there was now added a further theory. It postulated the existence of the primal instincts—what are known as the instincts of life and of death. This postulate served to extend the theoretic basis that underlay the fourth step, to solve certain unexplained problems and to bring together and simplify the various theoretical hypotheses that had been so far set up.

I

Let us now proceed to discuss in detail and in due order these four steps in the development of instinctual theory. The first theory made a distinction between sexual and ego instincts and was set up as a result of clinical observation which showed the central importance of mental conflict in the production of neuroses. In support of it Freud adduced the beliefs of popular psychology and, more emphatically, certain biological lines of thought. In view of what will be said further on, it is important to note the following passage in his 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (2): 'I am altogether doubtful whether work upon psychological material will afford any decisive indication for the distinction and classification of instincts. Rather it would seem necessary to apply to this material certain definite assumptions in order to work upon it, and we could wish that these assumptions might be taken from some other branch of knowledge and transferred to psychology.' Thus, according to him, it is hardly possible to arrive at a classification of the instincts along purely analytical lines.

During the period when this first theory of the instincts held the field, Freud's interest was taken up with developing the sexual theory. His conclusions are mainly to be found in his *Drei Abhandlungen* (6), where they were given progressive formulation. The sexual theory falls naturally into three parts: (1) the thesis of the component

instincts, which is linked to the concept of erotogenic zones; (2) the thesis of an ontogenetic development of the sexual instincts taking place in successive stages and following a fixed order prescribed by biological laws; and (3) the libido theory (which amplifies and underpins the first two theses) and also, perhaps, the theory of the transformations of the sexual instincts in general.

It is necessary to enter into the subject of the sexual theory at this point for two reasons. In the first place because the concept of instinct which was arrived at in this field of knowledge and which underlay the sexual theory has been used by many writers to challenge the later hypotheses put forward by Freud; and in the second place because of the quantitative view of the instincts which was held at this time and which gave way later to a qualitative one.

We will first turn to the question of the concept of instinct. According to the most usual definition, instinct is an energy arising from the vital stratum of the mind and having a direction which is determined inherently. Since many facts seem to indicate that instinct originates in organic phenomena, it can be described, with Freud, as being a borderline concept between the mental and the organic spheres. In this way the concept of instinct comes to be classed under the concept of stimulus: instinct is a stimulus of the mind, distinguishable from other kinds of stimuli in that its operation is constant and comes from the interior of the body and not from outside. Thus one can also regard it as ' a measure of the demand for work imposed upon the mind in consequence of its connection with the body.' (3)

According to this view instinct, whatever may be the form in which it becomes a tension of psychical energy, is always, as being a stimulus, contrasted with the mental apparatus with its postulated methods of functioning. Concerning those methods of functioning themselves some assumptions are necessary, and that necessity, as we know, has led to the laying down of certain principles of mental happening and certain fundamental trends of the mental apparatus. We shall return to this point later; at the moment what we must bear in mind is that the principles or regulative mechanisms regulate the mental apparatus, while the instincts continually impose fresh demands for work upon that apparatus, so regulated. This contrast between instinct and mental activity is perhaps most clearly expressed in a passage in ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' (5). There the distinction between sexual and ego instincts is described as an auxiliary construc-

tion of a provisional kind, while the thesis that there is a basic trend of the mental apparatus ' to abolish stimuli which reach it, or to reduce excitation to the lowest possible level, or even . . . to maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition ' is laid down as a necessary postulate.

Since the instincts spring from the organic field, the question of their source becomes an important one in their classification. The three characteristics of an instinct as stressed by Freud—its source, aim and object—can be employed as criteria. Of these, the object is the most variable ; the aim is less variable, though still somewhat so ; but the source is relatively constant and is therefore the best qualified to serve as a basis for a classification of the instincts.

Thus at this stage, in which the sexual theory was being elaborated, the idea of source was the most important criterion of classification. The source of an instinct, being the site of its inception, is from its very nature thought of as linked to an organic event. Such an organic event is in its turn hypothetically regarded, in accordance with the theory of hormones, as a kind of chemical process—as being, possibly, an accumulation of sexual substances or a concentration of chemico-sexual processes which then undergo a fresh distribution or are perhaps dissolved. The organ from which an instinct arises usually coincides with the place at which it obtains satisfaction , or else the place of satisfaction is an organ from which some other component instinct originates.

The differentiation of the separate component instincts is based upon the various organs from which they originate—what are called the erotogenic zones. The aggregation of the component instincts into the homogeneous group of the sexual instincts is based upon their common characteristics and regular relationships. The concept of erotogenic zones is in the first instance purely descriptive and derived from the oral, anal and genital zones of the body. Their distinctive signs are experimentally verifiable, and are excitation, action and satisfaction ; the last of these takes the form of characteristic pleasure-processes, which are different in the case of the oral and anal zones from those in the genital zone.

Instinct, then, is an energy which arises from the vital stratum of the mind, which has a direction that is determined inherently, which presses forward towards a particular aim and is directed somewhat loosely towards things and persons as its object. It is linked to an organ of origin as its source and to a terminal organ as the site of its

satisfaction. Its satisfaction consists in the removal of those changes in the zones of excitation which accompany the instinctual tension. Or, to put it more shortly, an instinct is something that ' comes from outside ', produces energy and is the cause of particular mental processes.

When the component instincts had been aggregated into the homogeneous group of the sexual instincts and had been assigned to predetermined biological stages within the framework of sexual development, it became necessary to set up the libido theory to provide a basis and amplification. According to that theory the instincts are to be regarded as purely quantitative amounts of energy which can be variously localized (displaced) and concentrated. The qualities of the component instincts do not belong to the instincts themselves but are derived from their sources. This hypothesis made it possible to describe in a comparatively simple way the inter-relationships between the erotogenic zones, the transformations of one component instinct into another, and so on. As will be seen presently, the distinction which was afterwards made between the instinctual qualities on the basis of their *aim* made it impossible to explain those transformations without making certain other assumptions.

Meanwhile the ego instincts were being somewhat neglected. The concept of ego instincts was only a provisional one, as can be seen from Freud's formulations of it at the time. They were of a purely tentative nature ; and so, at bottom, was the whole classification of the instincts. This was due partly to historical and partly to practical factors. On the one hand, it was necessary first of all to solve the problem of the structure and development of the sexual instincts—a problem which was the first to offer itself for investigation. On the other, the manifestations of the ego instincts were much more difficult to recognize. The trends emanating from the ego and their modes of expression were much more complicated and consequently harder to understand. But the main reason was that before anything could be learned about them a certain amount had to be known about the libidinal instincts.[2]

It is important to notice that the ego instincts were not regarded

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[2] This applies to the situation as it was then. In the present state of our knowledge it goes without saying that a complete study of the ego presupposes an understanding of both the libidinal and the aggressive instincts.

as on the same level as the sexual ones. In ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' (2) Freud formulated the psychological conflict which can be discovered at the root of every neurosis as a conflict between the demands of sexuality and the demands of the ego. Thus we see that at that time the ego instincts stood for an ego, not as yet accessible to investigation, which was governed by certain tendencies.

The criterion of source which had been used for the classification of the sexual instincts was carried over to the ego instincts, of which the nutritional instincts served as the typical example. They too could be linked with organs of origin and termination, once more with the help of hypothetical chemico-physiological processes.

II

The motive for taking the second step in the development of the theory of the instincts came from the field of psychiatry. New facts appeared which could not be explained by any of the existing ideas and which necessitated a new addition to the libido theory, namely the concept of narcissism.

The concept of narcissism made the first breach in the independent existence of the ego instincts. It included three component parts: (1) A stage was introduced at the beginning of the life of the individual in which his instincts have no object. This stage was called primary narcissism. In it the object-libidinal attitude has not yet been differentiated off, just as there is no proper differentiation between the ego and the external world. The libido is either stored up in some way or other, as it is in sleep or in the embryonic state, and is ' quiescent ' and perhaps not yet roused to function; or it cannot as yet be distinguished or detached from the energy and functions of the ego—it is only operative, to use Federn's word (14), in a ' medial ' way. (2) The libido, after the separation between the ego and the external world has taken place, can take the subject's own person as its object just as well as any thing belonging to the external world. (3) By means of identification in the ego or the ego ideal, the instinctual energy can be transformed into narcissistic energy. In this case, too, it will act ' medially ', that is to say, in a secondary way.

The postulation of a libidinal energy operating in the ego necessitated a revision of ideas about the ego instincts. It implied that the energy of the ego instincts was libidinal in origin and that their aims were derived from the aims of narcissistic libido directed to the subject's own self and acting within and upon it. The ego instincts were nothing

more than libidinal instincts directed to the ego and hence somewhat differently organized. Just as the reality principle, for instance, was merely a modification of the pleasure principle and yet could turn against it, so the ego instincts seemed to be libido modified in its aims, which was nevertheless able to turn against the true libidinal instincts. This hypothesis is connected with a particular view of the origin of instinctual aims. According to it the general aim of libido appears to be pleasure, but its particular aims are derived from the particular objects to which it is directed. Mental conflict is no longer a conflict between sexual and ego instincts but between parts of the sexual instinct which are directed to the external world and parts which are directed to the ego—between object-libidinal and ego-libidinal trends. This explanation of conflict as a clash between different interests was a possible one, but not easy to maintain ; moreover it was too simplified to take all the facts into account.

It seemed inevitable that this undermining of the independent status of the ego instincts should throw doubts upon the dualistic character of the instinctual theory. For there was now only one group of instincts—the libidinal instincts. Instincts were no longer classified with reference to their source but primarily with reference to their relations to various objects, which in their turn seemed to modify the instincts' aim. In essentials this already implied the view that the sexual and the ego instincts were only differentiated products of a common ' primal libido '.

Nevertheless Freud kept firmly to the idea of the autonomous nature of the ego instincts. This may to a large extent have been because he had classified the instincts in accordance with biological considerations and those considerations were not at first upset by his new discovery of narcissism. The life of the individual seemed to have quite different interests from those concerned with the preservation of the species. Thus it was natural to suppose that different forces were at work. Moreover, the phenomena of sadism in its wider aspects had not as yet been explained. Freud therefore introduced the notion of ego interest in the sense of a non-libidinal egoism ; or, to put it more correctly, he asserted that what was known as egoism had two components, a libidinal-narcissistic component and a non-libidinal component. Narcissism, as he wrote (7), is only ' the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature.' Originally these two components were undifferentiated.

Thus Freud still upheld the view that the nature of the ego instincts was originally non-libidinal. And this view was supported in the first instance by considerations of a theoretical and heuristic kind.

III

Later on, on the strength of empirical observation and theoretical arguments, the non-libidinal portions of the ego instincts were given some additional attributes which tended to confirm their independence of the libido. This constituted the third step in the development of the theory of the instincts, a step which gave the aggressive trends an independent status *vis-à-vis* the libidinal currents and classed them as belonging to the ego instincts.

Let us see what the observations and arguments were which led to this attempt to classify the instincts in this way. The most important reason was that the theory had not, so far, adequately ordered or explained the known facts.

Where the sexual instincts were concerned, it was primarily the position of their sadistic components which still lacked a sound theoretic basis. At first it had seemed as though sadism was erotogenetically bound. Sadistic impulses were to be found on every level, though in a form which apparently varied with the nature of their source or their erotogenic zone. The oral, anal and phallic levels each had their sadistic constituents. As the field of observation widened it seemed more and more probable that sadism was an independent component instinct which permeated every level, was able to ally itself to any other component instinct, had its own vicissitudes and could be regarded, in accordance with the dominant criterion of that time, as linked to the striated muscular system as its ' source '. Viewed in this way, sadism occupied a more curious position than ever in contrast to the purely libidinal instincts. What was particularly difficult to account for was the contradiction between the *aims* of the two. This contradiction seemed to call for a different genetic history for each. The term ' sadism ' undoubtedly included all sorts of phenomena, some of them not of an erotic kind, ranging from sexual perversions to impulses of cruelty and harshness which were devoid of any manifest eroticism ; and finally it was also employed for certain ego instincts.

As regards the ego instincts, too, various component instincts could be distinguished. In connection with the criterion of source, hunger and thirst seemed to be the appropriate representatives of the ego instincts. But in the course of time they came to lose that position.

Closer inspection of the ego instincts made it possible to introduce a more fundamental classification of them. Impulses to control could be distinguished from defensive impulses; and instincts of power and of self-assertion could be added to them. The impulses to control seemed to be related to the trends of power and neither differed very much from many sadistic manifestations of instinct. The defensive trends, too, which could be sub-divided into impulses to flight and to attack (destructive impulses) exhibited an unmistakable streak of aggressiveness. Thus most of these ego trends had to be credited with an aggressive character; it became necessary to suppose that, in addition to sexual sadism there was a 'sadism' of the ego instincts, while they in their turn entered into the service of the libido in the form of instincts of dominance. All this made the situation more than a little complicated. It was precisely this concept of the sadism of the ego instincts that showed clearly what an undue extension the notion of sadism had undergone. The terminology used at that time was the result of the absence of any distinction between the relation on the one hand of sadistic phenomena to libidinal phenomena and on the other hand of aggressive phenomena to sadistic ones.

Since the idea of sadism embraced facts of a disparate kind, the question was, how could the relationship be cleared up between the two sets of instinctual components—between those with aggressive and those with libidinal aims? There is only a limited number of ways in which we can imagine this relationship. Either the libidinal and aggressive instinctual phenomena start from something that is primal and common to both and only become differentiated in the course of development; or they each have a different origin and follow separate though at times intersecting lines of development.

The first of these possible views, namely that they have a common origin, is a monistic one and seeks to regard the libidinal and aggressive phenomena of instinctual life as products of differentiation or modes of the manifestation of one and the same instinct—bipolar phenomena which can replace each other. [Such a view has been maintained in different forms by Reich (16) and Fenichel (17)]. . . .

The alternative view of the relations between the two groups of instinctual impulses is a purely dualistic one. It assumes the existence of two qualitatively different instincts and endeavours to subsume all the relevant phenomena under them. While the first view draws its support from the existence of phenomena which contain both sets of trends in an undifferentiated state and is met by the problem of

accounting for their emergence in a differentiated form, in the second view it is precisely the undifferentiated phenomena which constitute a stumbling-block and have to be accounted for with the help of the theory of fusion.

Before committing himself to the dualistic theory, Freud, as has been seen in the passages referred to in his ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ', put forward the possibility of a bipolarity of instinct as its ordering principle. But, after having compared the aims of the two groups of instinctual trends and established their disparate character, and after having discussed the question of the ' transformation of love into hatred ' and denied the possibility of such a thing, he rejected the idea that there was a genetic relationship between the two sets of phenomena.

Thus aggressiveness (including hatred and sadism) and libido differed in regard to aim and origin. But this still left aggressiveness in an uncertain position in the framework of the instinctual theory. Freud's next attempt to solve this point was to ascribe the characteristics of aggressiveness (or ' sadism ', to use the then current term for the last time) to the ego instincts and to assume that, side by side with an opposition between the sexual and ego (aggressive) instincts, which expresses itself, among other things, in conflict, certain states of fusion between them also occur.

It is important to notice that in this connection Freud did not as yet talk about instincts of aggression as independent entities but only about the aggressive aspect of the ego instincts. This seemed to offer a provisional answer to the question of the relationship between aggressiveness and the ego instincts—namely, whether there are any phenomena of aggression at all outside the field of the ego-preservative functions. (The problem of erotic sadism is not affected by this question.) The question goes back to the empirical fact that aggressiveness appears only or almost only when the life instincts or the ego instincts are exposed to harm. It is a question which will come up again later on.

This third step, then, furnished provisional solutions to a great many problems. In the first place, sadism was taken out of the category of sexual instincts and put among the ego instincts ; and in this way the independent character of the ego instincts was asserted. But this amounted only to a reshuffling of the two big groups of instincts, not to a new classification of them. In the second place, the idea of states of fusion threw a little more light upon the situation. The sadism of the sexual instincts would arise from the aggressiveness

of the ego instincts and would emerge (5) ' when the sexual function is governed by the ego instincts ' : the latter would ' impart to the instinctual aim as well the qualities of hate ' (the general name for aggressiveness at that time). Freud attempted to trace the evolution of the influence which the ego instincts have over the sexual instincts, starting from the ambivalence of the oral stage and passing through the sadism of the anal stage to the love belonging to the genital stage, at which love and hate come into direct collision for the first time. Conversely, the ego instincts might themselves receive an admixture from the libidinal side, as in narcissism. In the third place, an alteration in the criterion of the classification of the instincts was thus brought about. The notion of instinctual source gave way to that of instinctual aim. The typical example of the ego instincts was no longer hunger but ' hatred ', viz. aggression. As we know, the fact of there being different instinctual aims had already led to the problem of the position of sadism. At the same time the question arose whether along with this change of criterion from source to aim there went an alteration in our concept of instinct. As far as the sexual instincts were concerned, this stronger emphasis upon the instinctual aim had entailed no such alteration. It must be remembered, moreover, that instinctual source still retained its significance as a criterion ; and so did the theory of energic tension with its chemical foundation. Even if no chemical hypothesis could be formulated for the ego instincts, the general concept of instinct which had been gained from the sexual instincts could nevertheless be carried over to them. They, too, could be regarded as demands for work imposed upon the mental apparatus, as tensions which set going certain activities which procured satisfaction by the attainment of their aim—hunger, for instance, and its resultant impulse to control—, as stimuli which impinged upon the mental apparatus and produced energy.

Thus this third step in the theory of instinct apparently solved a whole number of problems. It seemed to establish the aggressive ego instincts as independent entities ; to render plausible the fact that the aim of ' sadism ' was not purely sexual, by means of the theory of instinctual admixture ; and to order and clarify the various manifestations of libidinal and non-libidinal aggressiveness.

IV

The Problem of the Instinct of Aggression.—The need to re-model the theory of the instincts and take another step forward was felt as

a consequence partly of research into sado-masochistic phenomena in their widest sense, partly of the fuller knowledge of the structure of the mental apparatus which was obtained as a result of the advance from the study of the repressed forces to that of the repressive ones as well.

In describing this fourth step (which must, in my opinion, be separated into two parts) I shall no longer give a purely historical survey, based upon Freud's works in the order of their appearance, but shall discuss it rather from a systematic standpoint.

The necessity for assuming the existence of an unconscious sense of guilt led to a new conception of the structure of the personality. The ego and the id were contradistinguished, and the ego was looked upon as having arisen out of the id and as being an organized portion of it. The id comprised (1) the vital stratum, in which the instincts had their place of origin and which was in free contact with the ego, (2) the repressed portion of the instincts, which was prevented from having free communication with the ego by anti-cathexes, and (3) the unconscious part of the ego, that is, the super-ego.

The fourth step in the development of the instinctual theory consisted in removing aggressiveness from the ego instincts—i.e. no longer viewing it as a component instinct or as a characteristic of the ego instincts—and in putting it, as an independently subsistent instinctual group with aims of its own, in the vital stratum of the mind. In this way the new theory asserted that there are two groups of instincts in the vital layer—the libidinal and the aggressive (or destructive) group. Each instinctual group moves forward towards satisfaction on its own account; and, partly through a free struggle to obtain it, partly through the influence of an ego which is subjected to the pressure of the external world and of the super-ego, each enters into a great variety of relationships with the other, whether of an associative or an antagonistic kind. Both can easily come into opposition with those trends of the system which operate in a self-preservative sense and which are represented in the ego (the ego instincts). In contradistinction to the instincts of sex and of aggression, which work in the vital layer and are directed to objects, are the ego instincts whose field of operation is the ego.

At this point three questions arise: Why did this fourth step have to be made? What is the advantage of a new instinctual theory which, although dualistic from a genetic point of view, recognizes three sets of instincts? Have the concept of instinct and the criterion for its classification undergone any change?

Since, as we saw from our discussion of the reasons for making the third step in the instinctual theory, it was found necessary to take away the aggressive trends from the sexual instincts and ascribe them to the ego instincts, the whole problem of establishing an instinct of aggression on its own footing is narrowed down to the question of whether aggressive trends of a non-libidinal nature play any rôle outside the functions of the ego.

There seems to be no doubt that there are in fact aggressive trends which, without betraying any sexual characteristics worth mentioning, do operate outside the field of the self-preservative functions. Moreover, to range aggressiveness completely under the ego instincts is a doubtful proceeding in those cases where its action comes into opposition with those instincts. Manifestations of sexual sadism might possibly be accounted for on the theory of an admixture of the ego instincts ; but this is not so easily done with masochistic manifestations. The ego instincts are representatives of the ' instinct which constrains every living thing to cling to life ' (8). That pain, which could only be regarded as a signal acting in the service of this life instinct, should itself become the aim of a masochistic instinct, seemed contrary to the laws of biology, even though the idea of sexualization might offer a possible explanation. But the difficulty became still greater where melancholic depressions exerted a self-destructive power —depressions which Freud described as characterized by ' an overthrow, psychologically very remarkable ' of the self-preservative instinct (8). The same is true of those trends of the super-ego which are turned against the self, as, for instance, in the need for self-punishment, which seems to act like an independent instinct.

These manifestations, against which the ego has to defend itself, just as it has to defend itself against the libidinal impulses, cannot easily be explained as being due to the aggressiveness of the ego instincts. And it is clear that Freud very soon dropped that view. He does not mention it except in the passages from ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes ' which have already been quoted. Nevertheless, the problem of whether manifestations of aggressiveness appear outside the defensive functions of the ego does remain in a sense unsolved, and to that problem belongs also the question of the relationship between the intoxication of omnipotence felt by the ego and the degree of intensity attained by the gratified instincts of aggression.

It was only logical that, when the contrast was made between the ego and the id and it was shown that the ego had to defend itself against

the instincts of the id, the aggressive trends should have been placed, as autonomous instinctual forces, in the vital layer of the mental apparatus. To do this was, as Freud says in the sixth chapter of his *Civilization and its Discontents*, not to make any fresh change in the theory of instincts but was ' merely a matter of coming to closer quarters with a conclusion to which we long ago committed ourselves and following it out to its logical consequences ' (9).

The postulation of the existence of an independently subsistent instinct of aggression undoubtedly facilitated a description of the facts in question. The ego was now thought of as being obliged to struggle with aggressiveness exactly as it was obliged to struggle with libido ; it could give way to it, sublimate it, repress it, alter it by means of reactive formations, mitigate it by adding libidinal elements to it or offer itself as an object and so direct aggression onto itself (perhaps *viâ* the super-ego). But of course the mere establishment of such an instinct did not solve everything. The problem had come to be not so much one of destructiveness in its outward operation as of destructive trends turned in upon the self, as they could be observed in melancholia, the need for punishment and the *Schicksalsneurose* or neurosis of fatality. Here it seemed to be a matter of a destructive instinct at work inside the subject himself and this was still more difficult to account for on biological lines than was the existence of pleasure obtained from pain in the narrower field of sexual theory. It looked as though our first investigations of the ego had revealed the existence of what was, phylogenetically speaking, the most recent instinct—an instinct which might have arisen along with the civilization of man.

Primary Destructiveness.—It cannot be doubted that the super-ego exists and that it can, in certain circumstances, carry its punitive trends to the length of destroying the subject himself. Nor can it be doubted that to explain the latter fact as a turning of aggression against the self does not furnish an adequate theoretical account of the phenomenon. Such an explanation is merely the starting point for a discussion of the true problem. How is it possible that the aggressive instincts should be turned against the subject's own person to the point of self-destruction ?—that is, how can we explain such a state of things from the hitherto accepted biological standpoint ? It will be quite in keeping with the methodological principles of psycho-analysis if we assume the existence of some more fundamental thing in virtue of which this turning of aggression against the ego can take place.

This thing can be nothing else than an instinctual trend which somehow has a self-destructive effect but whose manner of working is not visible at the first glance.

The problem was already present in some sense in the sexual theory; and Freud stated it when he asked whether sadism or masochism was the primary phenomenon, viz. the older of the two from a biological point of view. Even at that time he adduced the parallel problems from the development of the purely libidinal instincts and established the fact that in sadism, unlike the other component instincts such as exhibitionism, there did not exist, or could not be shown to exist, a stage that was analogous to the narcissistic stage.

The observation of the clinical phenomena mentioned above, as well as the fundamental methodological need to find an original model [3] in analogy with the parallel hypotheses of the libido theory, made it necessary to assume the existence of a ' self-destructive ' trend which somehow operated within the self. This trend would be a kind of primary destructiveness and would be analogous to primary narcissism. Aggressiveness directed onto objects would be the counterpart of the object-libidinal trends; and the manifestations of secondary destructiveness would correspond to those of secondary narcissism (15).

This analogy was supported by the observation that similar fluctuations occur between aggressiveness and self-destructiveness as occur between a narcissistic libidinal position and one which is oriented towards objects. Aggressiveness can become directed inwards in the same way that self-destructiveness, if it reaches a dangerous pitch, can find a safety-valve by being turned outwards in the form of aggression.

Here, then, is the problem. If the hypothesis of a primary stage of the destructive instinct is theoretically unavoidable, how can a trend of this kind be formulated? It was in endeavouring to answer this question that Freud opened up those lines of thought which have led to so much misunderstanding and contradiction. . . .

The Theory of the Primal Instincts.—In order to fill in and gather together the theoretical issues involved in the fourth step and in order to solve the problems raised by it, Freud now introduced the theory of the primal instincts. These, according to him, are the life instincts and the death instincts. The theory was not set up on the grounds of any fresh psychological material or indeed of any question of a psycho-

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[3] [This point is explained and elaborated below, p. 121.—ED.]

logical nature; it was the result of certain theoretical problems which had been raised by previous hypotheses and which it was designed to solve. It was thus in the nature of a theoretical sub-, or rather, superstructure and was a theory of the second order as compared with the instinctual theory which had so far been directly built up upon clinico-psychological data and problems. It was a biological theory of instinct, since it rested almost entirely upon biological considerations. Instincts of life and death are not psychologically perceptible as such: they are biological instincts whose existence is required by hypothesis alone. This being so, it follows that, strictly speaking, the theory of the primal instincts is a concept which ought only to be adduced in a theoretical context and not in discussions of a clinical or empirical character. In them, the idea of aggressive and destructive instincts will suffice to account for all the facts before us.

By drawing this sharp distinction between the two concepts we are more likely, I think, to avoid certain errors and to ensure the clarity of our clinical descriptions.

Some confusion of thought has been created, especially as to the relation between the death instinct and the repetition compulsion, by the manner in which Freud introduced his theory of the death instinct. Let me therefore at once point out that, although he used repetition compulsion as evidence of the existence of the death instinct, the evidence from that source is not to be regarded as indispensable. His writings show in the main two classes of argument in support of the theory of the death instinct. I should like to contrast these with each other under the name of a *speculative* and a *theoretical* line of argument respectively. The speculative line is fully worked out in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (10); the theoretical one is more lightly indicated and is scattered in various places, but it can be collected to form a whole. We will turn our attention to the speculative line first.

The Speculative Basis of the Theory of the Death Instinct.—It would be beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the reasons which led Freud to the hypothesis of a repetition compulsion and the various problems which are bound up with it. It is enough to say that the result was that he found it necessary to postulate a regulative mechanism which acted independently of the pleasure principle and appeared to be much more primary than it (i.e. earlier from a historical point of view and more elementary), and which must be regarded

as a primal principle, a primal characteristic of life, and therefore a characteristic not only of the death instinct but of all instincts.

The concept of repetition compulsion is a complex one and comprises several aspects. (1) Repetition compulsion is an expression of the 'inertia' of living matter, of its 'disinclination to abandon an old position in favour of a new one' and therefore of a conservative trend which always inclines to maintain the existing state of things. (2) In consequence, there is a tendency to keep to certain forms of adaptation and to certain circuitous routes as a reaction to any disturbance of the usual processes. This may be described as the 'impressibility of life'. Adaptations once acquired are retained and reproduced. Under this heading may be placed the basic law of biogenesis and the biological concept of reproduction in general. (3) The conservative nature of life, however, does not express itself only in the maintenance and reproduction of already established processes, but also in a backward-looking trend which aims at surmounting or, as it were, throwing off adaptations which have been imposed upon it and at re-instating more primitive situations, that is to say, historically earlier ones. Here inertia and conservatism have become an active 'yearning for the past', a regressive trend. (This method of formulation was of importance as a ground for the assumption of the death-instinct.) (4) From the energic point of view repetition compulsion is found to be a special case of the trend towards abreaction. The large quantities of energy released by traumatic stimuli are bound by anti-cathexes and then gradually, as the traumatic situation is repeated over and over again, discharged in fractional amounts. Under this heading fall the dreams of persons with a neurosis due to an accident, the play of children, the manifestations of the transference situation in analysis, and so on.

As has been indicated above, the historical formulation of the repetition compulsion—as an endeavour to re-establish the *status quo ante*—was used by Freud as a basis for his assumption of the instinct of death. He started from the fact that the earliest moment at which organic life can be said to exist is the moment when it emerges from inorganic, dead matter. The phenomena of inertia in the world of physics, which is no more than an opposition to any change, becomes, as it were, in the realm of biology, an active trend—from the historical standpoint a retrogressive one, and, from the energic standpoint, a trend towards a relaxing of tension, towards absolute rest. But at this point the difficulties involved in this speculative line of argument

become evident. Apart from the many handicaps from which it suffers in the hypothetical field, . . . there is the further objection that it regards the death instinct as the original one and implies that the life instincts came into existence subsequently as a result of the chances of development. The life instincts are thus subordinated to the death instincts, as is seen when Freud says in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that fundamentally the life instincts act in the service of the death instincts. According to this, the life instincts would create tensions of every possible kind only to submit them to the death instinct with its inevitable trend towards relaxation of tension. Freud's speculative effort in this field is indeed a pessimistic one : it affirms that the true essence of life is death.

A subordination of this sort of the life instincts to the death instincts does not seem, however, to be entirely justifiable theoretically. At any rate, the converse of it is quite as possible and arguable. In his *New Introductory Lectures* (11) Freud emended this view in so far as he treated the two instincts as synchronous and co-ordinate in their operation : life consists of life and death instincts alike.

The Theoretic Grounds for the Theory of the Death Instinct.—Freud's first suggestion, which seemed so pessimistic, was due to the fact that the need for assuming the existence of instincts of life was not nearly so pressingly felt as the need for assuming the existence of instincts of death. In so far as the existence of the life instincts had to be conceded theoretically, it was done more for biological reasons than for psychological ones. Sexuality as a relationship between germ-cells of different sexes, or rather between the bearers of those cells, does not make its appearance till some way on in the course of phylogenetic evolution. It must, therefore, be either a new acquisition, or, more probably, a modification (made necessary, perhaps, by the need for adaptation) of some older instinct which may have exhibited the most general characteristics of the sexual instincts, such as a trend towards bringing things together or, from the energic aspect, towards creating tensions.

This new conception of the instinctual theory, however, obviously proceeded above all from the necessity for solving the problem of primary destructiveness. We have already seen what considerations led to this problem and need not go into them again ; but the question admits of certain further points of discussion.

As we know, psycho-analysis has always had a biological orienta-

tion, and the theory of instinct has hitherto rested upon a biological basis. It is therefore quite natural that it should seek to find a pre-existing biological model for the destructiveness at work within the individual. The task before it, then, was to formulate the biological model for the primary destructive trend which operates in the mind and whose existence seems so probable on theoretical grounds. Just as it was found earlier that aggressiveness ran counter to the libido in its aims, so now aggressiveness turned against the self must contradict the self-preservative principle of life—unless there was something in life itself which made possible a turning back of this kind.

The questions which we shall now have to discuss are firstly, how is primary destructiveness to be defined? and secondly, how are we to understand the biological 'compliance' whose existence has been assumed?

The problem of finding the original model of the self-destructive trends (both primary and secondary) leads inevitably to the subject of death; for the question of the nature of death and its place within the scheme of life is in a sense the same as that problem and should help to solve it. Thus the relationship between life and death, if there is indeed a biological model for self-destruction, must be thought of as more intimate than is usually supposed. In other words an essential characteristic of life must be its relation to death. This statement of the problem leads straight to the sphere of biology and narrows down to two alternatives: is death merely the outcome of an injury from without? or has life a natural end? If the first alternative is true, life is, theoretically, an eternal process which is only terminated by destruction from outside. If the second is true, death is a necessary component of life. Each of these views about the nature of death implies a corresponding view about the nature of life.

It would take us too far afield to bring forward the various relevant biological facts and considerations; we must content ourselves here with answering two questions. The first is the one that has already been asked, and it has been answered by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* where he expresses the cautious view that there are a number of facts that speak in favour of the occurrence of natural death and none that definitely exclude it.

The second question is: is natural death, which, as we know, overtakes the soma only and not the germ plasm, a phylogenetic acquisition which has been made possible by the emergence of the multicellular organism and which has nothing to do with the essential

nature of life? Here also, the answer may be that in the course of phylogenetic evolution something has merely become differentiated which was already an integral part of the unicellular organism—that is, that natural death is an original 'character' of life, so that dying, too, is something which instinct strives after.

If this is so, what does it mean in the dynamic sense? If life is regarded as a closed system moving in an orbit, as it were, round a fixed centre of gravity, death must be something that is foreign to that system; it can only be destruction coming from outside. But if life is regarded as proceeding in a linear course, then death is something that is essential to life; it is the goal towards which life is being driven. Living is dying, a process moving towards death, towards zero potential.

But it seems to me that Freud's conception of life is neither of these things, but a third which is a combination of the two. According to him the life system is governed by two trends: it moves towards zero potential but in doing so it creates new tensions. It is, to quote a simile of Aster's, like a self-winding clock. In the individual, life, it would seem, leads inevitably to death; but if life is taken as an integral process including the past and the future and looked at from a larger standpoint than that of individual existence, then Aster's simile holds good. The struggle of the Titans is constantly creating new forms of life and new deaths in an apparently unending and interminable procession.

The Significance of the Theory of the Death Instinct.—What does the concept of the death instinct do towards clarifying the theoretical problems under consideration and towards unifying the various attempted solutions? Not everything, but a good deal. The biological model of primary destructiveness has been seen to be an instinct of death which can be formulated as a tendency moving towards absolute rest, towards zero potential. From that instinct primary destructiveness and aggressiveness, and all forms of them that turn back upon the self, can be derived. This cannot be done, indeed, without the assistance of certain auxiliary constructions which, though doubtless unsatisfactory in many respects, rest upon certain facts of observation.

To begin with aggressiveness. The fact that aggressiveness can be turned back upon the subject's own self and the equally observable fact that this retroverted destructiveness can once more be turned out

upon the external world in the form of aggression make it probable that similar processes and connections occur between primary destructiveness and aggression directed outwards—that is to say that in certain circumstances primary destructiveness is 'turned outwards'. The findings of crowd psychology, too, speak for this possibility. In this case the individual who is prepared to be aggressive is bound to an organized group and thus his aggression is diverted to a part of the external world which is outside that group, to a so-called 'enemy', whether that enemy is a hostile idea or a hostile group of persons. This fact, together with the clinical observation just mentioned, provides us with an *ontogenetic* model (to borrow Kris's words) on the strength of which we can proceed to construct a *phylogenetic* model. According to the latter, the emergence of the multi-cellular organism out of the unicellular one would presumably have the effect of rendering the self-destructiveness of the cells harmless, since they would be bound to one another (perhaps with the help of the libidinal instincts), and of making it in part turn outwards, in some form or other, as an instinct of aggression.

If we now try to tabulate the instinctual classification which we have arrived at in analogy with the parallel concepts of the libido theory, we find the following set of comparisons :—

Life Instincts (Eros).	Death Instincts (Primal Sadism, Primal Masochism).
The Sexual Instincts :	The Destructive Instincts :
Primary Narcissism.	Primary Destructiveness.
Object Libido.	Aggressiveness turned against the Object.
Secondary Narcissism.	Aggressiveness turned back against the Self (Secondary Destructiveness).

This symmetrical arrangement is not in any way due to a desire to establish a systematic series, but will be seen to have a rôle to play when we come to discuss the question of the visible manifestations of the death instincts.

The terms 'life instincts' and 'sexual instincts' on the one hand and 'death instincts' and 'destructive instincts' on the other, are used by Freud synonymously and without any distinction. And indeed it does not seem possible to make any sharp division, especially between the second pair. Nevertheless I should like to attempt to trace certain lines of demarcation for heuristic reasons.

The instincts of life and death are purely biological instincts, which operate in the organic sphere but which are reflected in some form or other in the mental sphere as well. The sexual instincts are only a specialized form of the life instincts. The same is true of the concept of the destructive instincts. The two terms are only generalized names for all libidinal phenomena on the one hand and all destructive, or aggressive, phenomena on the other. Thus if we are asked how those instincts manifest themselves we have only to point to all the facts that belong directly or indirectly to the field concerned. The phenomena of the sexual instincts are sufficiently well known ; and so are those of aggressiveness, whether turned outwards or back upon the self. All that remains, therefore, is to discover what are the mental representatives of primary destructiveness—these being parallel to the mental representatives of primary narcissism.

Are there any mental phenomena which may be regarded as expressions of this primary destructive trend ? The very fact that such a question can be asked at all, and that the existence of a primary destructive trend has had to be deduced in the first instance upon purely theoretical grounds, is tantamount to making the assumption that we are dealing with ' silent ' instincts. Primary destructiveness must, therefore, be defined in some such way as that it is the destructive energy in virtue of which we grow old and die mentally, to adapt Weiss's phrase (15). . . .

We cannot, then, describe primary destructiveness in any way except by definition. But the question remains, whether, though there are no direct products of it, there may not be some indirect ones ? Two facts seem relevant to this question : the need for rest and the need to suffer. I do not think that it would be difficult to show that there is probably such a thing as an instinctual desire for rest. The need for rest comes not only as a result of being tired ; it is a phase which alternates naturally with phases of activity or which occurs in the middle of the latter as though it was a primary need that had been neglected and was now demanding to be satisfied. The need for rest seems to govern the psychic apparatus quite as much as the need for pleasure. It is precisely the combined appearance of the two trends in the sexual instincts that led to their being equated in the first place. The instinctual need for sleep, too, or instinctual falling asleep, seems to be an expression of this instinctual need for rest.

A much more difficult task is that of demonstrating the relationship between primary destructiveness and the need to suffer. In this

connection Freud has introduced the concept of erotogenic masochism, which can be regarded to a certain extent as a normal phenomenon and which is characterized by having for its aim pleasure in pain, or more generally, a need to suffer. It is assumed that not all primary destructiveness is turned outwards but that some portion of it remains operative within, and, libidinally bound or softened, only emerges in the form of what is called erotogenic masochism ; and this assumption is an attempt to establish a direct connection between the postulated primary destructive instinct and the phenomena of masochism. . . .

Thus the need for rest would be a more or less direct reflection in the mind of the death instinct, of primary destructiveness ; but the need for suffering would be only indirectly derived from that instinct, with the help of the theory of instinctual admixture. Even pleasure in causing suffering to others is not, according to Freud, an immediate expression of primary destructiveness directed outwards but the result of a state of fusion.

To sum up : With the help of the biological theory of the death instinct it became possible to formulate the nature of primary destructiveness, which was a necessary hypothesis from a theoretical point of view ; and furthermore (though not without resorting to various auxiliary hypotheses) to obtain a unified view of destructive and aggressive manifestations. The heuristic advantage of these assumptions is, I think, unquestionable. But this is not all that the theory can accomplish in the direction of unifying the facts.

Instincts and Principles.—In discussing the concept of instinct as implied in the sexual theory we have seen that the instincts were contrasted with the functioning of the mental apparatus. On the one hand the characteristics of the instincts were examined, but it was necessary on the other hand to make certain assumptions about the way in which that apparatus worked : it was presumed to be regulated according to certain trends or principles. What, then, was the relationship between those principles and the instincts ? The instincts were regarded as tensions of energy which arise from the organic sphere and act in a ' disturbing ' way like an external stimulus upon the mental apparatus, and are then dealt with according to the regulative principles governing that apparatus. This is what was meant when instincts were defined as demands for work made upon the mental apparatus. How the disturbing stimuli are to be classified seems a secondary matter compared to the adoption of the view that the

mental apparatus has a fundamental method of working in relation to all the stimuli that reach it, whether they come from without or from within.

It must once more be emphasized that in this general view the instincts were not thought of as directing the whole course of mental events, but only as being sources of energy and causes of excitation which set in motion the regulative trends of the mental apparatus.

Freud's basic assumption was that this apparatus is governed by a trend which strives towards a complete relaxation of tension or towards keeping down to the lowest possible level the quantities of incoming stimuli. At first he equated this trend with the pleasure principle, since tension seemed to call out feelings of unpleasure and relaxation of tension feelings of pleasure. Nevertheless there were various facts which could not be made to fit in with this view. The reality principle represented a modification of the pleasure principle according to which pleasure was no longer sought directly and immediately but along devious ways adapted to reality and over an extended passage of time.

But, for reasons which we already know, it proved necessary to detach the pleasure principle from the underlying trend towards relaxing tension and keeping it down to a minimum. Various ideas were put forward about this fundamental trend. It seemed to be a kind of principle of constancy concerned with maintaining tension at a particular level ; it was as though, in other words, the individual mental system was regulated at a particular state of equilibrium. Anything which seemed to disturb that balance whether in an upward or a downward direction was brought back by the regulative trend to the normal tension. It was the view which regarded life as something moving in an orbit round a fixed centre of gravity that found expression in the hypothesis of the principle of constancy or stability. It was then possible to define the pleasure principle, which directs mental processes towards an end-state of pleasure, as a modification of the principle of constancy. Everything which led nearer to the constant degree of tension or the state of stability was felt as pleasurable and everything which drew away from them was unpleasurable.

But as soon as the fundamental view of life was changed and it was no longer regarded as moving in an orbit but along a linear course, its basic trend had also to be differently regarded. The principle of constancy was accordingly replaced by the Nirvana principle, the trend of which was to effect a complete levelling down of all difference of potential—to reach zero potential.

Thus, if we leave on one side repetition compulsion,[4] we find that there are three regulative trends directed respectively towards a complete relaxation of tension, towards pleasure and towards adaptation to reality (or the Nirvana principle, the pleasure principle and the reality principle). The reality principle remains, on this view, a modification of the pleasure principle, but the relationship between the Nirvana principle and the pleasure principle becomes a different one from what it was according to the old view, according to which the pleasure principle was regarded as a special form of the principle of constancy. Now each corresponds to a different trend. Desire for pleasure on the one side and desire for rest on the other are the two chief regulative principles of mental life.

It is clear that only a provisional position has been attained by merely contrasting on the one hand the regulative principles of the mental apparatus and, on the other, the instincts which come from the outside and make themselves felt as a demand for work to be done. The heuristic principle, which would lead us to enquire to what extent the entire mental organization and its modes of working are built up upon the instincts, must inevitably raise the question of whether the instincts exert an influence upon the trend of mental processes. But to ask this would be to ask what is the relation between mental principles and instincts.

This question arose all the more easily because the concept of instinct had undergone a change in the course of the development of the instinctual theory. Originally instinct was regarded as an energic tension arising from organic sources and automatically directed towards an inherently determined aim; that aim was attained circuitously *viâ* an object and consisted ultimately in a modification of the organ of origin of the instinct—in a return of the organ to the state in which

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[4] Repetition compulsion should also be reckoned among the regulative trends. It is a general regulative principle and serves to bind energies, i.e. to bring them from a state of 'flow' to one of 'rest'. That a regulative trend of this sort does exist seems beyond doubt. The way in which the ego works, too, presupposes this possibility of binding, and of arresting tensions—of making them static. In the same way the repetition compulsion seems to be a *sine qua non* of all the other regulative trends. The quantities of incoming stimuli (in so far as they have not been confined to certain channels in the course of phylogenetic processes of adaptation, or if they have overflowed the capacity of those channels) must be arrested and bound before the other regulative forces can come into play.

it was before the stimulation occurred. It was in conformity with this view that the idea of instinctual source was chosen as a suitable criterion for the classification of the instincts.

The impossibility of discovering sources of this kind for every instinct and the difficulty of constructing them hypothetically, especially in relation to the ego instincts, brought into the foreground the notion of instinctual *aim* as a criterion. This did not necessitate any radical change in the concept of instinct. The aim consisted externally in the carrying out of the purposive act upon the object and internally in the attainment of a relaxation of tension, as, for instance, in the case of the aggressive instincts.

But the theory of the primal instincts (the life and death instincts) was founded upon an essentially changed concept of instinct. According to it, instinct was not a tension of energy which impinged upon the mental sphere, which arose from an organic source and which aimed at removing a state of excitation in the organ from which it originated. It was a directive or directed ' something ' which guided the life processes in a certain direction. The accent was no longer upon the production of energy but only upon the function determining a direction.

But the mental principles, too, were nothing else than a determining ' something ' which decided in what direction psychological processes should move. The concepts of ' instinct ', ' principle ', ' regulation ', thus seemed to be very much alike. Just as the instincts regulated the course of biological events, so, naturally, did they regulate the course of mental events. It was no longer possible to maintain a strict contrast between a mental apparatus regulated by principles and instincts pressing in upon it from outside, since the instincts themselves now stood revealed as fundamental principles of life.

This led to the possibility of grouping the principles with the instincts. It would take us too far afield to go into this point in greater detail here. But we know how Freud pictured an arrangement of this sort. He writes: ' The Nirvana principle expresses the trend of the death instincts, the pleasure principle represents the claims of the libido [and thus corresponds to the life instincts], while a modification of the latter, the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world.' (12) The relation between the two main principles was pictured as being that the life instincts effect a modification in the course run by the processes of relaxation of tension, a modification which is associated with the emergence of pleasure. . . .

Let me add a few words upon the question of quantity. So long as the concept of aim was used merely as a criterion for classification, it in no way contradicted the quantitative concept of instinct. But it was otherwise as soon as quality of aim was regarded as a primary characteristic of instincts. To do so involved turning the instincts into mental *qualities* and restricting their *quantitative* aspect to each separate group of them (to the sexual or the aggressive group). There would then be two classes of instinctual energy which would be distinguishable by the quality of their direction, namely, the energy of libido and the energy of aggressiveness—or, as Weiss calls it, ' destrudo ' (15)—and no exchange of energy could take place between the two. (The problem of *confluence* of aim is on quite a different plane.) Although this view is a consistent one, it brings with it its own difficulties, connected partly with certain clinical facts and partly with the concept of a narcissistic reservoir of libido. The latter, according to Freud, is ' a displaceable energy, which is in itself neutral, but is able to join forces either with an erotic or with a destructive impulse, differing qualitatively as they do, and augment its total cathexis ' (13). Freud finds a solution in the supposition that the aim of the libidinal instincts, which are ' more plastic, more readily diverted and displaced than the destructive ones ', can be reduced to a mere need for ' discharge ' or relaxation of tension, in which the object and the paths of discharge are ' relegated to a position of no more than secondary importance '. The neutral reservoir of energy would thus consist of libido sufficiently reduced to be in a position to make contributions to libidinal and aggressive impulses alike. Thus a supply of pure energy—i.e. one in which the quality of its aim is inoperative—would be able to flow only from the libidinal to the aggressive instincts and only by the way of this undifferentiated reservoir of libido.

To sum up the discussion. For the sake of greater clarity we have so far been at pains to make the cleavage between the concepts under consideration as wide as possible. But I should now like to narrow the gap once more and to approach the actual structure of those concepts more closely. On the one hand, the biological life instincts which create tensions, the sexual instincts, the ego instincts, with their aim of maintaining life, and the pleasure principle—all these are somehow related to one another ; on the other hand, the death instincts which seek to cancel out tensions, the instincts of

destruction at work within, aggressiveness directed outwards, the trend towards a state of rest (the Nirvana principle) and the inclination to suffer—these, also, form a related group.

The 'mysterious' instinctual forces, which lie behind all this, work each in their own direction or against one another or with one another. They become combined in the form of masochistic pleasure in suffering, of sadism, of the need for punishment, of self-hatred, of aggressive ego instincts, and so on.

What we call instinct operates in a directive fashion upon biological events both in the physical and mental field. Under certain influences it becomes differentiated and concentrated into centres of tension which are somehow bound to organic phenomena as sources; it turns outwards upon an object, strives after an aim which consists externally in a particular kind of behaviour towards that object and towards the subject's own body, and internally in the removal of a state of excitation. How it operates to begin with inside the self is not clear. We can see more easily what it is doing when it is directed towards objects upon which it carries out purposive actions. In order to effect this, something has sometimes to happen to the organ of origin, sometimes only to the object. Satisfaction ensues sometimes in the form of a particular process that is run through, sometimes in a more diffused manner. But the instinct can also take the subject's own self as its object in various ways. It can turn into 'motive force' and so increase the energies of the ego. It can enter into a multitude of by-paths and it is so malleable that it can undergo a great variety of changes. We cannot classify it in any single uniform way, but now according to one point of view, now according to another—according to its aim, its object or its source.

All these facts, hypothetical opinions and theories have been formulated in concepts which are often ambiguous and vague. Exact and well-defined notions are not always possible in the region of psychology. But much has been gained if we have been able to advance into a new field and to set up a number of concepts which can shed a mutual light on one another, even if we have done no more than make a first approach to a set of facts which, upon the whole, are still unknown to us.

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NOTES ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF WAR CONDITIONS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION (1)

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Introductory

Shortly after the Munich crisis of 1938 a voluntary Committee was set up in London to consider the organization of emergency mental services in the event of an outbreak of war. A majority of the members were psychiatrists, many of whom were not primarily concerned with the theory and practice of medical psychology. Nevertheless the various Schools and Institutes of clinical psychology were adequately represented and on the whole the Committee worked with remarkable harmony and efficiency. It was soon apparent, however, that its deliberations were governed by three major preoccupations: first, with the possibility of an overwhelming air-attack on London; second, with the likelihood of panic developing amongst the civilian population; and third, with the prospect of an epidemic of shell-shock similar in type to that observed in the Army during the war of 1914–18.

On looking back, these preoccupations are quite understandable. The majority of those present had served as psychiatric specialists in the Armies of 1918 or in the Ministry of Pensions that developed afterwards. In many instances their first and last contact with the psychoneuroses had been with war-neuroses and pension-neuroses. Hence their views on organization were influenced by the standards of the ex-service medical officer. Indeed the prospect of a *Blitzkrieg* seemed to arouse a certain military zest which was soon apparent in the outlines given to the projected defence organization. On the one hand, they set themselves the task of coping with a ' blitz ' that might cause tens of thousands of casualties for days or possibly weeks on end in London alone and, on the other, they were dominated by the obsession that a civilian population can be treated like so many Army Divisions strung out in battle-formation. Patterns of defence organizations took shape which were reminiscent of the old ' line defences ' in France. Instead of lines, however, there were to be First-Aid Posts in the heart of the town, ringed in concentric circles with casualty clearing stations, intermediate hospitals, base-hospitals, and so forth. The population was visualized as streaming from the town to the country and various administrative bottlenecks were to be constructed in order to stem

this panicky or psycho-neurotic exodus. The people were to be got back to their homes as quickly as possible ; there was to be no hedge-hopping to the safer base hospitals. Whatever might have been said at the time in criticism of this scheme, it had one outstanding merit. It contemplated the treatment of psycho-neurotics by qualified psychologists. In any case the whole plan came to nothing. The Ministry of Health, ignoring the existence of the faculty of medical psychology, adopted a system which, although similar in outline, had no other redeeming feature. Reverting to the ideologies of the last war but one, the Minister decided, on the advice of the Royal College of Physicians, to put the organization of the emergency mental services in the hands of a neurologist assisted by a psychiatrist. And that was the end of a sorry story, which threatened to set back the development of clinical psychology by twenty years and did in fact shut the door on any prospect of systematic research on the psychology of a people at war.[1]

As the events proved, the Committee's original preoccupations were in the nature of false scents. The blitz did not materialize until almost a year after the outbreak of hostilities and even so has, up to the present, fallen short of the dimensions and severity anticipated. There has been no outbreak of war neuroses in the civilian population. Such signs of panic as have been manifested after the heaviest attacks never assumed a serious form. The pathological reactions noted have been due less to fear than to lack of adequate social organization. Finally, the civilian population has proved over and over again that it cannot and will not be treated like either disciplined or, for the matter of that, undisciplined troops.

Fortunately the Institute of Psycho-Analysis had taken time by the forelock, and had commenced its investigations on the psychology of the civilian population immediately after the Munich crisis. This investigation took the form of a questionnaire circulated amongst the practising Members and Associates of the British Psycho-Analytical

[1] Some measure of the official opposition to modern psychological methods may be gathered from the fact that repeated offers were made to the Ministry by the Institute of Psycho-Analysis to provide units for purposes of psycho-therapy, of research and of training personnel, both medical and lay. A scheme was also drawn up to train social workers of both sexes in the elements of mental nursing and so provide an Auxiliary Service for use in the event of extensive or intensive air-attack. All these offers were rejected without ceremony by the Ministry.

Society. The questionnaire was concerned with the reactions to the Munich crisis observed during analytic, therapeutic and consulting practice, together with observations made by each analyst in everyday life. The results were tabulated and discussed at meetings of the Society, as a result of which a further list of questions was sent out. The next step was taken on the outbreak of war. The Institute of Psycho-Analysis set up a War Emergency Clinic at 96 Gloucester Place. This was staffed by three teams of workers and was open three afternoons a week in addition to the weekly consultation day of the London Clinic of Psycho-Analysis. Its immediate aim was to provide advice and, if necessary, short term treatment for cases whose psychological difficulties had been precipitated or exacerbated by war conditions. At the same time the Emergency Clinic functioned as an observation centre. These two sets of data provide a check on the observations made *after* the actual blitz started. This check has been of the greatest value, particularly in establishing negative findings. One of the main drawbacks to the investigation of war-neuroses in the 1914–18 war was precisely that no investigations existed on war-reactions occurring before the actual declaration of war. Moreover there was then no accurate comparison between the war-reactions occurring during heavy fighting and those occurring at points or in localities where hostilities were at a low ebb or even in suspense. Absence of such data was responsible for a lot of confusion in the minds of those early workers who first tackled the problem in the Army. It accentuated in particular an artificial distinction that came to be drawn between war-time and peace-time neuroses. Actually these sharp distinctions were softened only after prolonged reflection and discussion in the immediate post-war years. The work done at the Institute before and during the first year of the present war rectified this omission. No doubt with a little more foresight it could have been more thorough. Investigations might have started a year or so *before* the Munich crisis. And they certainly should be continued for a year or two after the present war is over. But sufficient information has been gathered to provide a scientific foundation for the direct investigation of the psychological effects and immediate sequelæ of air-warfare in the civilian population. It is convenient therefore to consider the problem in three stages, viz. reactions observed prior to the outbreak, reactions occurring from the outbreak of war up to the Dunkirk retreat and reactions observed from the commencement of the real air-blitz.

I. The Munich Crisis [2]

A majority of patients ' reacted ' to the crisis. Most of the reactors were ' upset ' in varying degree and manner. Others reacted with a definite if transitory improvement in their previous symptoms. A minority were unaffected: they were apparently indifferent to or almost ostentatiously ignored the whole situation.

Signs of Mental Deterioration.—The majority of those upset reacted with some form of anxiety, varying in degree from apprehensiveness to panic. Other symptoms noted were fear of desertion (by the analyst) or of bodily injury in air-raids, agitation, hyperactivity (in the form of taking war-precautions), helplessness, bewilderment, confusion, sense of fatigue and sleepiness, mild conversion-symptoms (such as indigestion, flatulence, diarrhœa or increased micturition), gloom and depression, increased self-accusation and increased sexual difficulty. My own impression was that on the whole patients tended to react in accordance with their clinical type, a view that was shared by Brierley. It was clear that most anxiety types reacted with either increased anxiety or hyperactivity, but other observers reported a total of four cases of anxiety hysteria who were apparently indifferent. Apart from cases diagnosed as mainly hysterical in type, symptoms of increased anxiety were most frequently noted in patients with psycho-sexual difficulty (either inhibition or perversion). The reactions of (unconscious) homosexuals, also of those who were known to be in difficulty with the repression of unconscious sadism, were apprehensive.

The main obstacles to effecting clinical correlations of this sort were: first, that analysts rarely analyse typical cases, their patients belonging usually to mixed psycho-neurotic or ' character ' groups which do not react typically; secondly, that the reactions may take the form either of increased expression of emotion or on the other hand of increased defence against it. Some at least of the ' improvements ' noted by most observers were due to defence reactions. There were,

[2] Twenty analysts (Bowlby, Brierley, Eidelberg, Fairbairn, Foulkes, Friedlander, Geleerd, Gillespie, Glover, Heimann, H. Hoffer, Macdonald, Matthew, Payne, M. Schmideberg, Sharpe, Sheehan-Dare, K. Stephen, Stoddart and Thorner) report on crisis reactions. They quote 76 cases individually, and, as some of them have more patients than they mention and others only generalize without mentioning individual patients, it may be surmised that the following observations have been made on about 100 cases.

however, many confusing data. According to Payne paranoid and depressive borderline cases showed fear and anxiety most markedly some weeks before the crisis. According to Brierley a paranoid case was uneasy after, but relieved during, the crisis. Schmideberg observed one case of schizophrenia who got into a state of agitation ; another, who improved owing to previous treatment, was frightened, yet pretended to make a joke of the situation. Obsessional cases varied widely in reaction. Some showed increase of anxiety, others decrease, others again no change. Sharpe reported increased talkativeness as the main reaction in one obsessional case. There was little satisfactory evidence as to the reactions of depressives : these seemed to range between increased self-accusation and sense of responsibility on the one hand and a temporary sense of relief on the other. Some depressives, however, reacted with increased freedom, e.g. in outbursts of rage. On the whole schizoids were unaffected. Several analysts mention the importance of the transference situation, e.g. the patients' fear of being deserted by the analyst, their concern for their analyst's safety. Many of these reactions were regarded as indications of resistance to analysis. According to K. Stephen the attitude of the analyst to the crisis was of little importance in stimulating the reactions of patients ; but according to Sharpe and Friedlander it was of very great importance. Thorner mentions that his patients became suspicious of him, but this was not observed by any of the other analysts of foreign extraction.

There is some evidence for the view that reactions varied according to the social milieu of the patient. Some thought that clinic and non-paying patients were less affected than private patients. My own impression is that certain types belonging mainly to the intelligentsia (who constitute a majority of the cases in private analytic practice) were much more affected than other classes. It is possible that in formulating their impressions some analysts were inclined to fall into the error of regarding the reactions of this group as a ' standard ' pattern.

Friedlander, comparing the reactions of five English patients (differing in age, diagnosis and milieu) with those of three German patients, thought that there was more sign of agitation amongst the German group. H. Hoffer on the other hand thinks that Continental patients exhibited a better reality sense than English ones, but quotes only one case from each group. Geleerd observed that ' in Vienna (after the Nazi occupation) women did not lose their nerve as quickly as men.'

Signs of Spontaneous Improvement.—Some patients improved during the crisis. Stoddart reports a case of melancholia which became almost normal so long as the crisis lasted ; an obsessional case observed by Payne had a fear of air-raids for months, which diminished during the crisis week. Payne also reports two patients with war-phobia who both improved during the crisis. A case of anxiety hysteria with hypochondria noted by Macdonald wanted to join up as a relief from passive homosexual phantasies. Thorner reports a case of schizophrenia who felt relieved during the crisis because people were friendlier and talked to strangers ; this was her only reaction. Hoffer describes a case of hysteria who felt relieved because people were too busy to pay attention to her. This applied also to a case quoted by Schmideberg (anxiety hysteria with obsessional mechanisms). This patient had returned from abroad to join her husband, a solution of ambivalence conflict which gave relief and increased confidence. The activity of distributing gas-masks reassured her so much that she wanted no further analysis. Need for analysis reappeared a fortnight after the crisis was over. Schmideberg also reports a case of obsessional character, with paranoid and depressive reactions, who wished for war and felt very depressed after Munich. This was due largely to conscious anti-Nazi considerations and to the outlet for hostility which the crisis provided or promised ; the last war was a happy time for him and he hoped for renewed scope in a new one. According to another observer, the beginning of the crisis stimulated anxiety situations, the end the ' depressive position ' ; some patients showed ' manic ' reactions.

Apparent Lack of Reaction.—A minority of cases did not react to the crisis or reacted very little. The most outstanding report on this point came from Fairbairn, who states that seven of his ten cases showed no reaction. This may possibly have been due to the fact that they lived in Scotland. (It is unfortunate that all other observations were made on cases living in London, where, according to my impression, people were very much more affected than in the provinces.) However, Fairbairn states that when he visited London at the height of the crisis, he found that people were much less affected by it than by the death of George V or by the abdication of Edward VIII. This view is in contrast to the report of most analysts that nearly all their patients were affected. It also raises the question of personal bias existing in the minds of the observers. Some analysts regarded intense reaction to the crisis as perfectly natural, so much so that they viewed

absence of reaction as a sign either of repression or of ' manic defence '. Other analysts merely mentioned the fact that the patient did not react to the crisis without attempting to explain it ; Foulkes quotes the case of an Indian student who did not react because war did not affect him personally ; two cases observed by Fairbairn were too preoccupied with personal problems ; another had an outburst of anxiety which had nothing to do with the crisis. Friedlander, Sheehan-Dare, Gillespie and Brierley describe cases (obsessional character, borderline homosexual, cyclothymia, etc.) who did not react because they did not believe that there would be a war. Gillespie (1 case), Payne (2 cases) and Schmideberg (1 case) explain mildness of reaction to the crisis as an effect of previous analysis ; on the other hand, Sharpe observed a case who, just because of his previous analysis, took the crisis more seriously than he would have done otherwise. Several observers do not allow for any other explanation and regard lack of reaction in their patients as due to the ' manic defence '. Geleerd mentions a patient who talked about the crisis only when it was most acute and then said ' she would not care twopence if her husband were killed ; she cannot understand why people get so excited about it '. In my view this suggests the existence of a positive sadistic interest, and the question arises whether the apparent indifference of many cases was not rather a restraint of sadistic enjoyment. Payne mentions an obsessional case who was so slow in appreciating any danger that the crisis was over before she began to react.

Lack of reaction was evidently not determined by the clinical type : 1 case of anxiety hysteria (Stoddart), 1 severe hysteria (Bowlby), 3 hysteria (Fairbairn) ; 1 manic-depressive antisocial (Sheehan-Dare) ; 1 schizophrenic with obsessional defences (Fairbairn) ; 1 cyclothymic (Brierley).

After the Crisis.—Most of those who were relieved *during* the crisis, but also some who were frightened, reacted with disappointment or depression to the ' peace '. One observer explains this as stimulation of the ' depressive position ' ; Sheehan-Dare (in discussing reactions of friends but not those of patients) pays attention to the political reality factor ; Eidelberg explains the feeling of shame by ' guilt over the unconscious relief ' ; Payne mentions a case who had hoped for change of occupation, solution of personal problems, etc., in war ; the same applies to some degree to a case described by Schmideberg : this patient, consciously anti-Nazi, expressed his deep disappointment with

the Government and the nation by an overwhelming feeling of disgust, hopelessness and disillusionment, closely resembling the disappointment in an over-idealized love-object. According to Payne's observations, peace meant that the aggressive father was uncontrollable; the patient lost faith in the good father and returned to flight, castration, hopelessness. According to Thorner, the strongest reaction of a paranoid or depressive type became manifest after the crisis. Matthew describes a case of anxiety hysteria with hypochondria who improved during the crisis and developed intensified hypochondria afterwards: 'the emerging of a real bad external object offered relief from his sense of guilt concerning his own internal badness, the passing of the crisis forced him to incorporate the bad object, leading to intensified hypochondria.'

Although little attention is paid to delayed reactions, various analysts say that phantasies and reactions provoked by the crisis stimulated the analysis and could still be observed for some time afterwards.

Ætiology.—There was a general consensus of opinion that, whatever the nature of the ultimate reaction, its intensity and form were due to infantile and for the most part unconscious patterns and conflicts. Nevertheless there was wide variation in the valuation of endopsychic and environmental factors respectively. Also there was wide difference of opinion as to the exact nature of the unconscious content. Unconscious phantasies discovered varied from patient to patient and the interpretations given from analyst to analyst. Amongst those who attributed a preponderating influence to endopsychic factors there were two schools of opinion; one group interpreted them in terms of 'good' and 'bad internalized objects', 'depressive positions', 'manic defences' and 'reparation' tendencies, the other used the more classical terminology of 'identification', 'positive' or 'negative Œdipus situation', 'castration anxiety', 'repression', 'self-punishment', etc. Foulkes held that reality situations such as the crisis did not provoke unconscious reactions and saw no point in continuing treatment during the crisis. Payne explains improvement in a previously existing air-raid phobia on the grounds that phantasy is more frightening than reality. This view represents a compromise between the two extremes described above and subsequent discussion showed that it was shared by many analysts. It does not allow for the fact that the crisis itself was never a real external danger, but, as subsequent

events proved, an unusually realistic danger signal. Even so, many cases discounted, ignored or denied the seriousness of that threat of immediate war on alleged rational grounds. Besides, it can be argued that for many patients the crisis was not confined to the last week of September. They may have realized the threat days, weeks or years earlier, in which case the assessment of danger may have had more to do with their conscious (mostly socio-political) interests, judgement and information than with unconscious mechanisms. On the other hand it is certain that many depressive types showed exaggerated pessimism and apprehension of unconscious origin even although events proved their estimate of the international situation to have been accurate. It is interesting to note, however, that, despite differences in their ætiological views, practically all observers agreed that patients reacted to countries concerned in the crisis and to the personalities who played a leading part, e.g. Chamberlain, Churchill, Hitler and Goebbels, as if they were family imagos. Usually they were assessed as father imagos (good, bad and indifferent), but some observers noted that in certain cases this covered a deeper reaction to the mother imago. These interpretations are perhaps the most convincing evidence that analysts were agreed as to the preponderating importance of individual endopsychic factors in shaping crisis reactions.

Therapeutic Effect of Psycho-Analysis.—Payne, Sharpe and Gillespie stress the fact that both previous and current analysis influenced favourably the patients' reaction to the crisis. Stoddart states that in one case analysis did not modify the patient's reactions; Macdonald's general impression is that reactions during the crisis were little influenced by analysis; it was possible to do more work after the reality situation was settled. He has no definite view on the importance of previous analysis. Friedlander too is doubtful how much to attribute to previous analysis. Schmideberg considers that previous analysis certainly had an effect, e.g. an ex-patient with war phobia showed unusually little anxiety; on the other hand, current analysis did not seem to make much difference, perhaps because the reactions noted—mainly anxiety of varying degrees—were not extreme. Foulkes says that analysis cannot influence such reality situations and that for the duration of the crisis he interrupted the analysis.

General Conclusions.—Most observers were reluctant to draw conclusions from their data, and made no bones about saying so. Certainly

the difficulties were very great. Statistically regarded the material was scanty and was selected mostly on the basis of private practice. The results noted were frequently contradictory. Moreover it was obvious that the observers themselves had only one point in common, viz. their psycho-analytical training. Their ætiological preconceptions, their views as to the importance of external stimuli and their own reactions (political and emotional bias, reality assessment, etc.) to external stimuli varied widely. Finally, as Winnicott emphasized during discussion of the questionnaire, the conditions of analytical observation were unusual, in that the analyst himself reacted in some (presumably) characteristic way to the crisis. He was not, as in everyday analytic practice, an observer who by training and circumstances does not react personally to his patients' internal crises or external conditions. Despite these very considerable drawbacks, the investigation permits one to formulate some conclusions and reaffirms others of importance to the proper assessment of war-time reactions. It is clear that unconscious and deep preconscious factors determine the quality though not the intensity of war-time reactions in that section of the population which for one reason or another requires psychological treatment. Despite the relatively scanty material it seems that the same can be said of the population at large. As is so often the case, the reactions observed in pathological groups enable one to forecast, however tentatively, the reactions of more 'normal' groups. Thus it might have been surmised from study of the observations that, when actual war conditions supervened, the so-called normal population would show two distinct varieties of abnormal reaction. 'Ordinary' people whose character is of a hysterical or neurasthenic type would react with varying degrees of anxiety or minor physical upsets; whereas those who have an obsessional, depressive or paranoid 'make-up' would on the whole express their difficulties, not in the form of psycho-neurotic symptoms, but in various types of social difficulty. Such conclusions would have not only clinical but social importance. In particular they would indicate that problems of civilian morale are not simply political or economic in nature: they must be considered primarily from a medico-psychological angle.

II. The Pre-Blitz Period

This period runs from the declaration of war to the outbreak of air-hostilities on a large scale in this country. Strictly speaking it should exclude the Dunkirk period, since the military conquest by

Germany of the Low Countries and subsequently of France marked the beginning of a more realistic psychological attitude to the dangers of war. There was of course a preliminary period of reaction following the declaration of war. Unfortunately, this phase was not very well observed, since comparatively few analysts had returned to work from the summer vacation. It was clear, however, that there was little of the flamboyant excitement of the Munich phase. After a few weeks of tense expectation, the declaration of war evoked, by contrast, a sense of relief, shot through with anxious expectation. This relief was no doubt accentuated by the fact that by this time more people were in favour of fighting: the anxiety was mainly concerned with the possibility of violent air-raids. Many people who had anticipated this took the precaution of evacuating London, as did many of the more neurotic amongst the population. After a comparatively short time, however, the population settled down to a war which, it was anticipated, would, on land at any rate, follow the pattern of 1914–18.

In accordance with pre-arranged plans, the Psychological Aid Centre was set up at the London Clinic of Psycho-Analysis in Gloucester Place. Apart from one Press and radio notice, no attempt was made to advertise the Centre and owing to black-out restrictions the consultation hours had to be fixed at a comparatively inconvenient hour in the afternoon. In any case, it was soon apparent that, as far as neurotic reactions to air-raids were concerned, the Centre would have nothing to do. The first bombing casualty was, I believe, one rabbit killed during a casual bombing incident in the Shetland Islands. Nevertheless, there was a small trickle of consultations, totalling 29 up to the time of Dunkirk. More than half of these (16) came in the period September to December 1939. Fifteen (15) of all cases examined during the pre-blitz period were typical psycho-neurotic or other types in whom no special relation between war-conditions and their breakdown could be established. Disturbance of social relations due to war might have increased their general difficulties or made these difficulties a little more obvious, but did not affect the clinical picture. Some of this group had been referred to the Centre because it offered short term treatment and because there appeared to be little prospect of getting a vacancy for regular psycho-analytical treatment. Others attributed their condition to the war, but no confirmation of this view could be obtained. A second group (6 cases) were also found to have suffered from neurotic symptoms, mostly of an anxiety type, before the war. But they complained of definite deterioration on the outbreak of war.

Thus one case of marked inferiority feeling was anxious about loss of friends, especially girl friends. A hypochondriac of twenty years standing had an acute exacerbation. All the anxiety types had experienced more or less sudden increase of worry. A psychotic character developed a siren phobia. In the remaining 8 cases, changed conditions due to the war had acted as a striking precipitating factor, but in four of these there was evidence of a commencing neurotic breakdown prior to the war. For example, a patient who came complaining of a horror of gas attacks which made its appearance at the commencement of war was found to have a mixed anxiety and obsessional state of a year's duration. In the others, the apparently sudden outbreak of anxiety was traced to earlier but typical anxiety states. Thus, out of all the cases observed at the Emergency Aid Centre, only four had developed definite *psycho-neurotic symptoms* dating from the outbreak and apparently due to war conditions only. Even so in two of these cases it was doubtful whether the attack was so spontaneous as it appeared. One depressed state was caused by the internment of the patient's husband and was relieved when steps were taken to alleviate his situation. Only a few of the cases examined were followed for a sufficient length of time to estimate the relative importance of the ' war time ' precipitating factor. The details of one case, however, deserve some consideration. The patient was a man of forty-seven who came to the Centre in December 1939 complaining of depression and fits of crying, inability to work and insomnia, all of about ten weeks duration. He was positive that these symptoms dated from shortly after the outbreak of war, when, owing to reorganization of the firm where he was employed (he was a cashier), he had been transferred from the south to the north of London. Owing to this upheaval he had been cut off from all his accustomed friends and haunts. Because of petrol rationing he had been compelled to lay up his little car. Black-out restrictions further curtailed his social life. Although he was suffering from generalized anxiety he had had no fear of bombs in the last war and did not believe he would have in this. There was every reason to suppose that this was a case where the disturbance of social milieu was a major precipitating factor in his condition. He was allocated to Dr. M. Schmideberg for short term treatment and was given thirty-three sessions spread over about four months. Dr. Schmideberg reported that, despite the apparently convincing history of ' war-time ' reactions, the patient had gradually become more inhibited and anxious during the previous ten years. It

also transpired that a precipitating factor in the breakdown was the fact that he had been called upon to do a lot of extra work at the office. He did not dare to refuse and, when he realized he could not possibly finish it in time, he broke down. He had had a good deal of fear of his immediate superior and of the Managing Director. These two figures were substitutes for his elder brother and father respectively. The unconscious situation was a typical Œdipus one, accompanied by severe castration anxiety. He was terrified of losing his job, and was less able to stand up for himself since the sudden dismissal of a secretary who had been with the firm for years. It turned out, however, that this particular secretary had been in the habit of bullying the patient badly. The patient's satisfaction over the dismissal gave rise to the fear that he might eventually suffer the same fate. The separation from his cronies, whom he had unconsciously regarded as allies in the fight with his father, and the restriction of his activities owing to the black-out and to petrol rationing had increased his anxiety. Analysis of his aggression, particularly against brother- and father-substitutes in the office, brought about rapid relief. His symptoms disappeared: he took up work again and learned to stand up for himself in a normal manner. Six months after treatment he wrote that he felt 'more fit than ever', reported with satisfaction how well he handles his immediate superior in the office and gave an almost gleeful account of his experiences with local land-mines.

One other observation, made by Dr. H. Hoffer, was to the effect that refugee patients showed a more pessimistic reaction to current events than English patients. This was confirmed by observations made in ordinary Clinic practice during the same period.

Observations in the provinces were even more negative in character than those made in London. Dr. Bálint, for example, reports from Manchester that no clinical changes of any kind could be detected during the pre-blitz period. Fairbairn is even more emphatic on the point. He says: 'There was no analytically significant change to be observed in any of my patients.' He goes on to make the point that outbreak of war conditions produced no analytical reactions comparable with (1) the uncertainties of the Munich period and (2) reactions to the illness and death of King George V. Comparing the three periods, he concludes: 'the analytical reaction provoked is in inverse ratio to the reality value of the provoking circumstances.'

Apart from observations made at the Aid Centre, some information, mostly of a negative character, could be obtained from study of the

ordinary psycho-analytical activities at the Clinic. During the pre-blitz year there was a falling off in the total number of consultations, as compared with the previous year, but it was up to the average of earlier years. There was, however, an increase in the numbers attending after the outbreak of war, followed by a steady decrease afterwards. This decrease was readily accounted for by the following factors: call-up of younger men, increased household duties of women, war-work, voluntary evacuation of nervous types and black-out or traffic difficulties. With one exception the distribution of cases in the various psycho-neurotic and other groups was the same as in peace years. There was no very definite sign of increase in the hysteria group (anxiety states, phobias and conversion symptoms). The total was slightly larger, but the figures were too small to permit a definite conclusion. There was, however, a very definite increase in the depressive group. On the other hand, no very obvious correlation with ' war ' conditions could be established for this depressive group.

The ' waiting-list ' of the Clinic provided more interesting data. Under peace-time conditions this list is revised from time to time, when it transpires that, although a number of cases can no longer be traced, the large majority of patients waiting analysis wish to have their names retained, on the grounds that their mental condition has either remained unaltered or has positively deteriorated. Only occasionally does one get a letter stating that the patient is better and does not desire treatment. During the pre-blitz period there was a large drop in the waiting list. Analysis of the reasons advanced indicated two factors: the desire to continue at war-work without being disturbed by treatment and spontaneous improvement of symptoms. Both of these observations support the view that the outbreak of war caused an alleviation of conflict in a well-defined group.

Apart from these direct observations of the more pathological groups in the community, the state of mind of the general population can best be inferred by the response to Government evacuation schemes. The fact that the very greatest difficulty was encountered in maintaining these schemes indicates not only that the system of breaking up families was strongly opposed to the spirit of the people concerned, but that these people did not regard the current war situation as a dangerous or even threatening one. It confirms the view already indicated that, after a short preliminary period of agitation, the country settled down again as if there were no war. Unfortunately the most valuable information as to the general reaction of the public

could not be followed up. Fluctuation in apprehension, rumour formation, suspicion, spy-mania, disgruntlement, criticism of the Government, etc., etc., were not systematically observed. It is perhaps a safe guess that, apart from a few temporary siren phobias in the London population and the outbreak of suspicion, spy-mania and scapegoat hunting at the end of the period (i.e. at the fall of France), no reactions of any consequence occurred.

Conclusions.—Observations of the pre-blitz year yield few general conclusions. Obviously there was little justification for any very abnormal reactions. Such reactions as did occur fell into the same groups as the Munich reactions—viz. on the one hand anxiety and sometimes depressive reactions, and on the other a variety of social, as distinct from psycho-pathological, reactions. Improvement in previous symptoms as the result of changed conditions was again noted. The view that unconscious factors were the main determinants of such disturbances as did occur was confirmed. Schmideberg's case illustrates this point very clearly. The importance, as a precipitating factor, of changes in the social setting, i.e. disturbances in social contact with family and friends, and of social restrictions, was confirmed.

[It is hoped to publish Part III of these notes, dealing with the Air-Blitz, in the next number.—Ed.]

THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE

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1. The Primal Horde

The first psycho-analytic interpretation of culture as a whole was given by Freud in *Totem und Tabu*. After having killed the primal father, the sons of the primal horde identified themselves with him and forbade themselves the very things which he had forbidden them to do. Society and culture were thus erected on the basis of the *post mortem* obedience of the victorious sons.[1] An implicit assumption in this theory is that of a collective unconscious. If we accept this assumption we are justified in interpreting group activities of succeeding generations as if they were performed by the same individual. Is it probable that mankind ever lived in the ' Cyclopean family ' [2] type of social organization ? Since the publication of *Totem und Tabu* we have had corroborative evidence on the life of higher monkeys and apes and we know that what has been described as the dominance type of society [3] is very similar to the picture so familiar to us from the immortal pages of *Totem und Tabu*. Moreover in many myths of primitive people we find certain traits which strongly suggest the ' primal horde ' as opposed to the pure ' Œdipus ' explanation.[4]

We find a certain radical contrast between the victorious brothers (sons) and the father ; the latter may be a supernatural being or an animal or a demon, while the young heroes of the story are alone human in our sense of the word. Freud's assumption of the primal father's psychological attitude as being fundamentally different from that of the young males [5] might be regarded as an explanation. In these myths we find an individual as opposed to a group and we find that the myths are placed at the beginning of human evolution. Institutions or human culture are derived from the tragic event, just as described in *Totem und Tabu*.

Let us assume for the moment that mankind actually lived, or the forerunners of mankind actually lived, in the ' dominance ' or ' primal

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[1] Freud, *Totem und Tabu* (1913), *Ges. Schriften*, X.

[2] Lang and Atkinson, *Social Origins and Primal Law* (1903).

[3] Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (1932).

[4] Róheim, *The Riddle of the Sphinx* (1934), Chap. IV.

[5] Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1922), 92.

horde ' type of social organization [6] ; so far as the evidence regarding the higher apes goes there are other observers who describe monogamous forms of the family, and, as for the myths, it is quite possible to explain them as based on the Œdipus complex and projected into the past. In other words, they are not necessarily records of phylogenesis, they may also represent an attempt to explain phylogenesis on the lines of ontogenesis.

However, if we make the initial assumption of a primal horde period in the past, the next difficulty that confronts us is to explain how such a period could have survived in traditional forms. If we accept the collective unconscious this difficulty does not arise. But there are weighty arguments against this assumption. It is one thing to accept inherited dispositions and quite another to assume the latent memory of an event or even of a series of events in the dim past.

If then we try to do without this assumption, there are two ways to explain the survival of the primal horde tragedy from pre-human to human days. I have argued in favour of both possibilities. In the baboon horde described by Zuckerman there are real battles for supremacy in the horde when the ' overlord ' begins to show signs of decreasing strength or potency. Besides these, however, there are sham fights which partake of the characteristic features of the real struggle. Hardly a day goes by without an uproar among the bachelors. This usually begins with one animal adopting a threatening attitude, opening his mouth and baring his teeth. The disturbance spreads through the whole group. The riot becomes general and spreads to the married groups. ' The more aggressive animal seems to be unaffected by the increase in the number of enemies he has called upon himself and thus a baboon fight assumes its peculiar character—*a single animal defending himself against a group*. Usually the group retreats whenever the single animal advances.' [7] The sham fights are probably abreactions of the real primal horde tragedy—play repetitions revealing their origin in the formal element (one against many). We may regard them as halfway between real repetition and repetition in the drama. Central Australian ritual as performed to-day purports to be a repetition not of the sexual battles fought by the ancestry, but of rites performed by these ancestors. These sham battles may have survived after the real primal horde battles had disappeared

[6] Cf. also Linton, *The Study of Man* (1936), 140.

[7] Zuckerman, *op. cit.*, 228, 250.

and may have been handed down from one generation to the other by imitation, traditionally, before human speech was evolved. The myth is a narrative of ancestral drama not of grim reality. For the growing generation these traditional dramatic performances had a functional value as a socialized sublimation of their own ontogenetically formed Œdipus complex.[8]

The other solution assumes that the primal horde type of organization was a significant feature of human pre-history but not the *fons et origo* of human culture in general. In this case the periodical killings of the leader may have survived in some modified form in human conditions and the myth could be a narrative of one of these latter events.[9] 'Actually we know that primitive kings perform incest and are ritually killed at the end of a certain period. No Baja king may live for more than fourteen years and his son and successor is also his murderer.'[10]

2. The Ontogenetic Theory of Culture

The theory of a collective unconscious would be an assumption we might be compelled to make if we had no other way to explain the phenomenon of human culture. I believe, however, that psychoanalysis has another contribution to offer and that this second suggestion is safer and easier to prove. The second suggestion is that the specific features of mankind were developed in the same way as they are acquired to-day in every human individual as a sublimation or reaction-formation to infantile conflicts. This is what I have called the ontogenetic theory of culture. I found a society in which the infant was exposed to libidinal trauma on the part of the mother and have shown that this predominantly male society was based on the repression of that trauma. In the same way I have shown that in a matrilineal society the libidinal trauma consisted in the father playing at devouring the child's genital and that this society was based on the fiction that there are no fathers.[11]

If we remember some significant passages in Freud's writings, we

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[8] Róheim, *op cit.*, 234 f.

[9] Róheim, 'Primitive High Gods' (1934), *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **3** (Suppl.), 123.

[10] Róheim, *Animism, Magic and the Divine King* (1930), 254.

[11] Róheim, 'Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types' (1932), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **13.**

notice that Freud also holds this second view of culture. If culture consists in the sum total of efforts which we make to avoid being unhappy, this amounts to an individualistic and therefore, from the psycho-analytic point of view, to the ontogenetic explanation of culture. If culture is based on the renunciation of instinctual gratification, this means that it is based on the super-ego and hence also explained by the fact that we acquire a super-ego.[12]

Or if we take Freud's papers in which he explains not culture as a whole, but certain elements of culture, we find that these interpretations are individualistic and psychological,[13] and not based on a hypothetical phylogenesis. Finally, if we consider especially the interpretations given by Melanie Klein and in general by the English school of psycho-analysts,[14] it is quite evident that all these interpretations of individual evolution also imply an interpretation of human culture as based on the infantile situation. Thus, if Melanie Klein regards symbolism as a necessary consequence of the infant's aggressive trends and the mechanisms mobilized against these trends and also as the basic elements in the subject's relation to the outside world and in sublimation, this implies an explanation of culture in terms of the infantile situation. If demons are explained as projections of the super-ego, if the functions of a medicine man are explained by the assumption that the help of an external object is sought against the introjected object, or if introversion or extraversion in an individual or a group are due to the flight of the internal or external object, these and many others are obviously explanations based on the infantile situation.[15]

3. Prolongation of Infancy

In the preceding paragraph I have discussed what may be regarded as two distinct types of interpretation. It might be argued that the

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[12] Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930).

[13] Cf., for instance, 'The Taboo of Virginity' (1918), *Coll. Papers*, IV, 217; 'A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth Century' (1923), *ibid.*, IV, 436; 'The Theme of the Three Caskets' (1913), *ibid.*, IV, 244.

[14] Cf. Klein, 'The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego' (1930), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **11**, 26.—[The author's references in this and other passages to an 'English' or 'London school of psycho-analysts' are open to criticism on more than one ground.—Ed.]

[15] Schmideberg, 'The Rôle of Psychotic Mechanisms in Cultural Development' (1930), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **11**, 389, 397, 414.

psycho-analytic interpretation of literature or art or magic is one thing and the interpretation of one specific culture as based on a specific infantile situation is another. I think the distinction is only apparent; if we can derive the art and science of Leonardo da Vinci from his infantile situation,[16] this is the same type of explanation as if we attempt to derive Central Australian ritual from the customs of Central Australian mothers and the experiences of Central Australian infants. I suppose most anthropologists would admit that some sort of correlation must exist between infantile experience and culture, but they might be inclined to favour the opposite view of cause and effect and say that the cultural pattern determines among other things also the type of infantile experience. It is quite true of course that the infancy of an individual is the origin of his behaviour as an adult but then again this infancy is determined by the behaviour of other adults, the infant's mother and father. If we go one step further and again interpret what the parents have done in terms of their infancy, we see that we are moving in a vicious circle and that we have here the old problem of the priority of the hen or the egg.

Culture is taken in its broadest possible sense in this paper and is equivalent to all those features which distinguish man from his brethren in the animal world. If we can find a distinctive feature in the biological make-up of mankind which is also a variation in the infantile situation and does not depend on cultural tradition, we are likely to have found the key that will unlock many locks. The idea that over-prolonged infancy is the decisive feature in human evolution is not new, and a variety of ways have been indicated in which the prolongation of infancy may have determined human evolution. Herbert Spencer explains maternal love as a useful variation in a species characterized by the prolonged helplessness of the infant[17] and Westermarck explains the duration of the marital tie in the human species on the same basis.[18] That man has surpassed the ape by passing on his experience to the next generation is obvious,[19] and prolonged infancy is a necessary condition for the existence of tradi-

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[16] Freud, *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci* (1910), *Ges. Schriften*, IX, 447.

[17] Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, II, 623.

[18] Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (1908), II, 191. Linton explains group formation similarly: Linton, *op cit.*, 141.

[19] Lowie, *Are we Civilized?* (1929), 293 f.

tion. Briffault has given full weight to the significance of our prolonged immaturity. Dr. Below writes: 'I have found that among animals that bring forth their young in a condition of helplessness, such as man, the dog, cat, rat, mouse, rabbit, the development of ganglion cells is incomplete at the time of birth and even soon after; whereas the horse, calf, sheep, guinea-pig show completely developed ganglion cells in every part of the brain almost always in the earlier periods of fœtal life, invariably before birth.'[20] This incomplete development is much more pronounced in the human baby than in any other young.[21] 'The retarding of the rate of growth, the bringing into the world of the young mammal as a helpless being before its full development, makes, then, so far as regards its anatomical structure, but the trifling difference represented by those microscopic filaments in the substance of the brain. But upon these almost impalpable cobwebs, a new world of being depends. Let the connections which they effect be completely established in the darkness and seclusion of the womb; the new-born creature is almost as well fitted for life as the parent; it can look after itself, feed, outdistance a man in a race.' In proportion to its perfection, 'in proportion to the specialization of its nervous interconnections, it is fixed, rigid, unalterable.' If, however, the connecting paths between inherited trends and environment are not completely formed before birth, we have a creature in which instinct is superseded by tuition. Hence, it is in exact proportion as the immaturity of the offspring is prolonged that the mammalian animal is superior in intelligence, in power of learning from experience and of adapting itself by modifications in its behaviour.[22] Our adaptation to reality is therefore conditioned by our retarded maturation in so far as this process manifests itself in brain structure. Another way in which our prolonged infancy must be regarded as a basic element in our adaptation to reality has been followed up by Bally. He says that in their preying activities the lower animals show rigidity in the form of their behaviour; whereas animals which remain for a long period under the care of their parents show variability in these actions. In the latter case the parents are putting their behaviour at the service

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[20] Below, 'Die Ganglienzellen des Gehirnes bei verschiedenen neugeborenen Thieren', *Arch. Anat. Physiol.* (Physiol. Abt.), 1888, 188.

[21] Briffault, *The Mothers* (1927), I, 102.

[22] Briffault, *loc. cit.* Cf. also Allen, 'The Dilemma of Growth' (1937), *Arch. Neurol. Psychiat.*, **37**, 859.

of their young for the purpose of enabling them to obtain oral satisfaction and to keep off their enemies. But the behaviour of the young themselves is phylogenetically determined and thus becomes undeliberate behaviour, without an object or with a substitute object ; in this way play arises.[23] As the oral needs are gratified by the parents the young animal or pre-human being can withdraw cathexis from the purely practical aim of eating to playful observation, to perception or introjection of environment ; and this would be what K. Gross has called the practice value (*Übungswert*) of our play activity. We have here some basis for regarding the reality principle, that is the capacity to tolerate delay, as being based on the pleasure value of play. An important difference between human beings and animals is conditioned by the retardation in our dentition and the capacity to move about. Whereas all animals effect a direct transition from mother's milk to adult food, the delay in dentition makes it necessary for human beings to have an interim period in which food of a milk-like consistency and quality is given to the infant.[24] A relative independence of motor reactions from the acquisition of food is thus developed and this independent play activity is the basic element of our culture. Apes are capable of trial activity, that is of an activity which is not rigidly riveted to the goal. And thinking is a reduced trial activity.[25]

If we follow the argument put forward by Bolk we see another series of steps that leads from animal to human life. Bolk finds that through retardation structural properties or relations that are only temporary in other primates have become stabilized in the human species.[26] Bolk attributes the slowing down of our growth to the endocrine system, to hormonal products that have inhibited maturation. Our troubles arise not only from the prolonged infancy of the species, but also from the discrepancy between the development of the soma and the germ plasm. The soma is relatively retarded as compared to the germ plasm, which means that humans are beings with a relatively prolonged infancy (compared to the total duration of life) and a relatively precocious sexual development. It is quite clear that we have here the biological foundation for early object relations, for the Œdipus

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[23] Bally, ' Die frühkindliche Motorik im Vergleich mit der Motorik der Tiere ' (1933), *Imago*, **19**, 341 ff.

[24] In primitive communities the situation is different. The suckling period is much longer and this transition period less significant.

[25] Bally, *op cit.*, 357.

[26] Bolk, *Das Problem der Menschwerdung* (1926), 7.

complex. The ties between child and mother last longer than in any other species and the sexual impulse has already attained a measure of object-directedness when the only available object is the mother. On the other hand it is also clear why a relatively undeveloped soma would necessitate the development of defence mechanisms,[27] that is, of an ego as a superorganic soma as protection against a premature inundation of libido.[28] Our relative immaturity would therefore explain the traumatic character of early sex experience and it is this line of human evolution that I have followed up in *The Riddle of the Sphinx*.

We know that Freud has pointed out how human nature is conditioned by three factors. The biological factor is the relative helplessness of the infant, the phylogenetic factor is the break in the development of human sexuality and finally the psychological factor is the differentiation in our psychical structure.[29] The second, or phylogenetic factor, is a specialized instance of the first, while the third is also a consequence of our relative immaturity. This amounts to the statement that human nature in general (or, what amounts to the same thing, that culture) is due to our prolonged infancy.

If, as Freud has shown, neurosis is an archaism or infantilism[30] and if obsessional neurosis is but an exaggerated instance of the normal super-ego formation of the latency period,[31] this amounts to the statement that neurosis is but an exaggerated form of culture[32] or that human nature as differentiated from animal nature is based on the conservation of the infantile situation. Finally, if we consider the facts revealed by the London school of psycho-analysts and their theoretical viewpoint, we see that here again the delay in maturation is the key to the whole system. For although Joan Riviere emphasizes the viewpoint that the helplessness of the infant when faced with its own *thanatos* is the primary and the dependence on the mother only a

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[27] 'We have reason to believe that the Œdipus complex and the castration fears that spring out of it are themselves consequences of the fact that in human beings the period of childhood is so prolonged.' French, 'Defense and Synthesis in the Function of the Ego' (1938), *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **7**, 547.

[28] Cf. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (1937).

[29] Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926, *Trans.* 1936), 139 ff.

[30] Freud, *op cit.*, 128.

[31] Freud, *op cit.*, 64.

[32] Róheim, *The Riddle of the Sphinx* (1934); in a forthcoming paper I have qualified this sentence and discussed the arguments against it.

secondary factor, one might well ask what this helplessness means if not an incapacity to bear even the smallest amount of frustration—that is, a state of absolute dependence on the mother? This psychological experience seems to be one of the peculiarities in man to which his evolutionary development has led. It is part of the same phenomenon as the long physical helplessness and dependence which the human child goes through, as compared with other animals.[33]

In following one line of argument we are explaining the origin of defence mechanisms against libidinal strivings as due to our retarded soma and relatively precocious germ plasm development (Bolk and Róheim). Then again it seems that the development of our brain (Briffault) and that of our capacity to tolerate suspense (reality principle) can be explained from the relative immaturity of the human infant (Bally). The differentiation of ego and non-ego, the mechanisms of introjection and projection, are due to the infant's incapacity to deal with its own aggressiveness and its dependence on its mother as a source of reassurance (Klein and Riviere). Finally, neurosis itself is an infantilism (Freud) and in a sense only an exaggeration of the essential feature of human development (Freud).

We may therefore accept the conclusion that psycho-analysis as a psychology is in harmony with a biological theory that would attempt to explain human nature on the basis of a specific infantile situation. But how is this to lead to the assumed differentiation of cultures on the basis of a differentiation in the infantile situation, i.e. in the infantile trauma customary in a particular human group?

If we see that in one society the nipple is given or withdrawn in a certain way, or that sleeping habits, or the way the adults play with the children, provoke certain libidinal reactions, we still do not see clearly how these specific situations could have evolved from the universal fact of delayed human infancy. The same question might be asked in every individual case. Why was A. subject to a specific trauma, why was a certain situation traumatic for B. and not for C? These are questions that are very difficult to answer—in these cases we invoke constitution as our *ultima ratio*. In the case of human groups we must probably do the same. For one thing, we have the fact of the unequal retardation of various races,[34] which in itself must

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[33] Riviere, 'Hate, Greed and Aggression', in Klein and Riviere, *Love, Hate and Reparation* (1939), 9.

[34] Bolk, *op cit.*, 37.

have some effect on the interaction of id, ego and super-ego and hence on the human psyche in general.[35] As for the variations in the mother-child situation, these may be compared to the variations in the coitus position or in the male-female situation. We know that the European or ventro-ventral position is not the characteristic position of some primitive races,[36] and that it is the position in which only immature apes copulate.[37] We might conjecture for instance that the absolute dominance of the male in Australian society leaves the women without an outlet for the male elements in their make-up and that these have to manifest themselves in the mother-child situation. At any rate, we must admit that such variations in the infantile situation exist and that they are probably based on constitutional variations of human groups.

On the other hand, I do not intend this theory to be taken too rigidly as a final determination of group character which will henceforth run on eternally in the same groove in a circle of infantile traumas, adult sublimations or reaction-formations and repetition of the same infantile traumas.[38] Even in a primitive group we must assume variations in the infantile situation and in the personality of its members. As the group grows larger [39] the range of these variations increases not only on account of the number of the individuals, but also because they are in a decreasing ratio subject to identical introjection-formations.[40] Culture has authorized and socialized a specific sublimation or reaction-formation and can therefore canalize the latent conflicts of its members in a decreasing proportion. Those who have other emotional needs will introduce cultural modifications.[41] As all human

[35] Róheim, ' Racial Differences in the Neurosis and Psychosis ', *Psychiatry* (1939), **2,** 375.

[36] Cf. Róheim, ' Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types ' (1932), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **13,** 41, 205 ; *Riddle of the Sphinx*, 253.

[37] Cf. Zuckerman, *op. cit.*, 285 ; Jacobsen, ' Development of an Infant Chimpanzee ', *Comp. Psychol. Monogr.*, **9,** 316.

[38] Cf. Money Kyrle, *Superstition and Society* (1939), 146.

[39] Cf. Lowie, *op cit.*, 293. (The savage solves his simple problem ; we fall short of solving a more intricate one.)

[40] We might compare primitive societies to the *family neurosis* emphasized by French psycho-analysts : Spitz, ' Familienneurose und neurotische Familie ' (1937), *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **23,** 548.

[41] The fact that in very primitive societies these modifications are based on dreams is a further proof for the decisive rôle played by the unconscious in culture formation.

beings consist of a bundle of id-trends and defence mechanisms and as culture provides a sublimation for only some of these, the others, not being thus satiated, will grow in momentum and provide the psychic background in the group which makes the reform movement possible. The suggestion made by Cora DuBois of an individual introducing a variation in a culture should therefore certainly be taken into consideration.[42]

4. Early Object Relations

In some of my forthcoming publications, I intend to discuss an obvious aspect of the retardation theory which has not hitherto been adequately considered from the point of view of psycho-analytical anthropology. This consequence of prolonged infancy has been commented upon by various non-psycho-analytical authors. Jevons writes: 'Now, as regards the family affections there can be no possibility of doubt; the infancy of man is longer than that of any of the animals, most of which can walk and take care of themselves almost, if not quite, as soon as they are born. Man's infancy, on the other hand, is so long that the human race could not have survived in the struggle for existence, had not the parental instincts and family affections being strong in primitive man.'[43] Social animals nurture their young and nurtured animals tend to be social. The social disposition seems to be a modified continuance of the infant's need for the nurtural parent's presence, and the infant is born with a simple attachment-to-mother tendency. Attachment to the mother is the sole source of food and protection. When the trend to retain the mother is thwarted, this naturally produces the utmost extreme of terror and rage.[44] The question of early object relations is a topic much discussed by various analytical schools. According to Fenichel the new-born infant has no ego. 'The human child is born in a far more helpless state than the majority of other mammals. It cannot survive unless it is cared for.'[45] The organism can get rid of tensions only through another organism and therefore in a biological sense the infant is anaclitic; but this does not mean that it is also anaclitic

[42] DuBois, 'Some Anthropological Perspectives on Psychoanalysis', *Psychoanal. Rev.* (1937), **24**, 254.

[43] Jevons, *An Introduction to the History of Religion* (1911), 46.

[44] Suttie, *The Origins of Love and Hate* (1935), 15 f.

[45] Fenichel, 'Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs' (1937), *Imago*, **23**, 245.

psychologically, for it has no concept of the object. The tension is hunger. When it has been satisfied by the mother, the infant goes to sleep.[46] Thus the first acceptance of environment is only an intermediary aim on the path of withdrawal from it.[47]

Joan Riviere, as representing the London school of psycho-analytic thought, agrees with Fenichel in describing the attitude of the infant as narcissistic, but she regards this as a narcissism which is dependent on introjection, i.e. on object relations.[48] Finally we have the Hungarian school of psycho-analysis which emphasizes the passive object love (Ferenczi) of the infant, its insatiable desire for the care and nurture of the mother.[49] This psychic attitude is a state in which the independent existence of the object is not yet recognized and might be called primary (archaic) object love and cannot as yet be differentiated from the egoistic sentiments. The Hungarian language describes the child's relations to the mother by the term, '*ragaszkodás*' ('clinging or sticking to')[50] and it is just this grasping or clinging attitude of the infant that Hermann has described as a primary attribute of our libidinal and ego-development.[51] It seems to me that Fenichel's objection to emphasizing the object-directedness of this early phase of development on the ground that the concept of the object has not yet appeared in the infantile mind would be more in keeping with the point of view of a psychology that identifies the psyche with consciousness than with the psycho-analytic attitude. After all, we are dealing with a phase of existence in which the clear-cut frontier between Cs. and Ucs. does not exist and in which the first elements of the psyche are emerging from the physiological situation. The characterization given by Freud leaves nothing to add to the description. 'Childish love knows no bounds, it demands exclusive possession, is satisfied with nothing less than all. But it has a second characteristic: it has, besides, no real aim; it is incapable of complete satis-

[46] Bernfeld, *Die Psychologie des Säuglings* (1925).

[47] Fenichel, *op. cit.*, 247.

[48] Riviere, 'On the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy' (1936), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **17**, 400.

[49] Bálint, 'Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs' (1937), *Imago*, **23**, 243.

[50] A. Bálint, 'Liebe zur Mutter und Mutterliebe' (1939), *Int. Z. Psychoanal. Imago*, **24**, 38.

[51] Hermann, 'Sich Anklammern—Auf-Suche-Gehen' (1936), *Int. Z. Psychoanal*, **22**, 349.

faction and this is the principal reason why it is doomed to end in disappointment and to give place to a hostile attitude.' [52]

Every little child in Normanby Island is *gewana*, i.e. always desirous or demanding too much. One frequently hears mothers scolding their children: '*gewana arena ojo!*' 'oh, you supreme pesterer!' The child is born in a state of relative immaturity, it needs more love than it can get.

In publications on the rites of covenant, or speaking more generally of union, I have tried to show how eternally infantile mankind continues to repeat the mother-child situation with the fundamental pattern of separation (anxiety, aggression) followed by union. In most cases the union is based on an oral introjection. If only one party eats the food, that party will depend on the other, but if both eat of the same substance, or both drink each other's blood, the tie and the obligation are mutual. The former situation is especially prominent in love magic. Girls will mix menstrual blood, their perspiration, or axillary hair into a man's food, and he then becomes completely infatuated.[53] In the country of Szatmar girls sieve mother's milk through the lower part of their shirt (the part that touches the vagina) and give cake prepared with this milk to their lovers.[54] The love potion is dangerous, as a marriage based on this oral introjection may easily turn into hatred and in this case the outcome might be death.[55] The pattern is the child-mother situation, the reaction to absence or frustration is aggression and anxiety. In some rites of the covenant type, i.e. in the case of those based on a mutual introjection or mother-child situation, the first phase of the ritual consists in slaughtering an animal. The Wadschagga kill a goat. The hide is cut off the animal when it is still alive and both parties spit on the hide. They are thus united through the saliva of both and through the blood of the animal.[56] The animal

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[52] Freud, 'Female Sexuality' (1931, *Trans.* 1932), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **13**, 286; cf. also Freud, *New Introductory Lectures* (1933), 159.

[53] Wuttke, *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube* (1900), 365 f.

[54] Róheim, *Magyar Néphit és Népszokasok* (1925), 59.

[55] Cf. Gutmann, 'Die Frau bei den Wadschagga' (1907), *Globus*, **92**, 2; Strackerjan, *Aberglaube und Sagen aus dem Herzogtum Oldenburg* (1909), I, 115.

[56] Raum, 'Blut- und Speichelbünde bei den Wadschagga', *Arch. Religionswiss.*, **10**, 265, 275.

slaughtered on the threshold when an honoured guest is expected[57] represents the aggression based on the separation and followed by the bond, covenant or reunion. The security of the house as a mother symbol is a reparation because it is based on the previous sacrifice of a mother or child symbol.[58] The castle of Liebenstein in Thuringia was made impregnable when a child was bought from its mother and walled in. It was eating a cake while the masons were still at work, and it cried: 'Mother, I see thee still!' Finally, when they put the last stone on, it cried: 'Mother, now I see thee no more!'[59] The bond between guest and host based on the conditional curse or *l-'ar* (Westermarck) brings out both the latent aggression implied in a covenant or the reparation aspect of the covenant itself and the mother-child situation as prototype of the host-guest situation. *L-'ar* means a type of union which automatically turns into a curse for the one who breaks the covenant. The strength of the conditional curse depends on the vehicle. Blood, bodily contact, food and drink are particularly efficient conductors. The sacred duty of a host in Morocco is based on *l-'ar*. If a person desires to compel another to help him, or to forgive him, or generally to grant some request, he makes *l-'ar* for him. He kills a sheep or goat or chicken at the threshold of his house or at the entrance of his tent, or he grasps with his hand either the person whom he has invoked or that person's child or the horse which he is riding, or he touches him with his turban or a fold of his dress. In short, he establishes some kind of contact with the other person, who is thereby compelled to grant his request.[60] Crawley explains all human relations as based on a mutual inoculation,[61] or, as we should call it, mutual introjection. He quotes the Narrinyeri custom of *ngia-ngiampe*. The barter between the tribes on the Murray river and those near the sea was carried on by agents who were mutually in the relation of *ngia-ngiampe* to each other. When a man has a child born to him he preserves its umbilical cord by tying it up in the middle of a bunch of feathers. This is called a *kalduke*. He then gives this to the father of children belonging to another tribe and those children are henceforth *ngia-ngiampe* to the child from whom the

[57] Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant* (1896), 5.

[58] Cf. Róheim, 'The Covenant of Abraham' (1939), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **20**, 452.

[59] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 100.

[60] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I, 586 f.

[61] Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* (New Edition, 1927), I, 285.

kalduke was procured and that child is *ngia-ngiampe* to them.[62] This means that they are in avoidance situations to each other. Evidently the *kalduke* is the bond upon which the relationship of mutual trust is based. But the *kalduke* is a navel string and the people who enter upon similar bonds are frequently called brothers or blood brothers.[63] The navel string is the bond that unites mother and child ; the parties of the ceremonial union are called brothers,[64] which means that man is a social animal because he is continually striving to overcome the primal separation trauma and to establish new mother-child situations.

An important difference between the animal and the human or infantile being is that while for the animal environment is nature, a stabilized world in which he is perfectly well adapted on account of his inherited reactions, for a human being at the dawn of life environment is essentially another human being—the mother—and the reactions of this environment are, from the point of view of the infant, highly labile. Recent work in animal psychology has shown that if gratification of a tension becomes uncertain, the result is a behaviour disorder in the animal, which is the prototype of a neurosis or psychosis.[65] In some cases which I have analysed I have found that the infant lives in an insecure environment, that he is bewildered by what for him is a confusing succession of tension and gratification, of ' bad ' and ' good ' mother-imagos.[66] In mankind the situation that is induced by the experimenter is the initial situation of his life provided by nature, that is, by our relative immaturity.

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[62] Taplin, ' The Narrinyeri ', in *The Native Tribes of South Australia* (1879), 32 ff.

[63] Crawley, *op. cit.*, I, 288 ff.

[64] As early as in 1918 the ceremonial blood-brotherhoods were explained by Jellinek as repetitions of the mother-child situation. (' Ethnologische Beiträge zur Psychologie der Freundschaft ', Budapest Psycho-Analytical Congress.)

[65] Cf. Stuart W. Cook, ' The Production of Experimental Neurosis in the White Rat ' (1939), *Psychosom. Med.*, **1**, 293.

[66] I do not believe there is a ' misunderstanding between adult and infant ' in the sense that the sadism of the adult frightens the infant, who only desires tenderness. Cf. Ferenczi, ' Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kinde ' (1933), *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **19**, 5. The ' misunderstanding ' or confusion is between the pure pleasure principle of the infant and the dawn of reality called forth by the alternately tension-creating and tension-dispelling behaviour of the mother.

5. Ego Development and Culture

The task of psycho-analysis is ' to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of vision and so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions of the id. Where id was, there shall ego be. It is cultural work, like the draining of the Zuyder Zee.' [67] ' One can hardly go wrong in regarding the ego as that part of the id which has been modified by its proximity to the external world and the influence that the latter has had on it, and which serves the purpose of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of living substance surrounds itself.' [68]

The development of the ego and that of culture must be closely related to each other and the ego is simply the *extroverted* part of the id. In his culture, or rather in a considerable part of his culture, man's face is turned towards his environment. It is this part of human culture that I have attempted to explain in a paper on ' the Origin and Function of Culture '. There I draw a distinction between food-gatherers and food-producers. It may be ' natural ', that is, phylogenetically pre-determined, for man to kill and eat animals or gather and eat berries, but it is certainly not ' natural ' for primitive man to plant a garden or to domesticate animals. If we analyse the ' professions ', apart from those of the hunter, the fisher and the gatherer of wild plants, we find that the most ancient of all professions is that of the medicine man. This is followed by trade and later by primitive agriculture, then the domestication of animals and finally plough culture. All these can only be explained as based on sublimations of specific aspects of the infantile situation. It shows very little insight into the mental processes of primitive man to believe that he is likely to plant yams because he has come to the conclusion that they will bring him a plentiful crop in the future, or that he keeps dogs because they are useful in hunting kangaroos. The carefree children of the jungle or desert never think of the morrow in pre-agricultural societies. But if they have associated phantasies of destroying the body with taking the yams out of Mother Earth, it would be easy to see how the reparation aspect of those phantasies might lead to a replanting, that this in turn might lead to an observation of the crop, and so secondarily to a practical result from the endopsychically conditioned

[67] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures* (1933), 106.

[68] Freud, *op. cit.*, 100 f.

activity. Or, if man extended the mother-child situation to the puppy of the wild dog, these dogs, brought up in human society, might prove useful in the chase; but this was a result of a play activity which nobody could have foreseen. My view, therefore, is that the bulk of human culture, even in its adaptational or ego-aspects, arises out of play or ritual activities. The reason for these activities lies in the infantile situation, and they acquire survival value secondarily by assimilating a part of the environment to man's needs. This is the way of culture—the transformation of id into ego.

There are two ways of facing environment: the way animals face it and the way humans face it. 'In unconditioned reflexes the path of the impulse from receptor to effector is already established when the individual is hatched or born. The link-up of the elements within the reflex-arc is hereditary like any other part of the individual's physical structure. In conditioned reflexes the path of the impulse from receptor to effector is not determined at birth. The link-up of the elements within the reflex-arc comes as a result of selection and routing of impulses within the reflex centres, coupled with the gradual wearing of a path through the synapses. The unconditioned reflex is the foundation of automatic or instinctive behaviour, the conditioned reflex the foundation of learned behaviour.' [69] I suppose it would be generally admitted that in the course of evolution the part played by the unconditioned reflex in adaptation tends to decrease and the part played by the conditioned reflex (that is, learning) tends to increase. What psycho-analysis has to add to this would be that the reflexes are conditioned in infancy and that learning is introjection; *therefore in the development of human adaptations the tendency is for adaptations that are based on the infantile situation to replace in an ever decreasing degree those based on the stimulus-reaction pattern.* Although, in the paper quoted above, I have dealt chiefly with man's adaptations or professions above the food-gathering level, there can be no doubt that the effects of the infantile situation have already been shaping man's destiny in the world for ages when he advances to the food-producing level. Language is born when the mother understands the babbling of her baby. Our tools are the projections of our body and we owe the art of making fire to a displaced play repetition of the genital act or of masturbation. In the venture called human life environment supplies the opportunity, the id supplies the

[69] Linton, *op. cit.*, 64.

capital, while the ego is the intermediary between the inside and the outside world. In this connection it may be worth while to point out certain differences between Fenichel's standpoint and my own. In a paper on the origin of money, in which he criticizes rather severely the usual psycho-analytic views on this subject and especially my own,[70] Fenichel explains his views on the subject, which are rather important from the point of view of method in applying psycho-analysis to culture: 'Some psychologists deny the remarkable process by which the relations of human beings to each other and to outer realities become independent entities or institutions, which then (*not further derivable psychologically*) act from outside as stimuli upon human beings, influencing their behavior'.[71]

'Sociologists, on the other hand, will be of the opinion that the craving for riches can only arise in a society in which the possibility actually exists of gaining real advantages and prestige by money and of becoming wealthy without performing work (that is, through the exploitation of the labor of others).'[72] 'Money has certainly not

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[70] Incidentally I regard my own papers in question as obsolete, because they use the primal horde hypothesis in a way that I should not approve of to-day. However, I intend to take up the question again in the future.

[71] Fenichel, 'The Drive to Amass Wealth' (1938), *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **7**, 70. The italics are mine. I do not quite understand the words italicized. Do they mean that the institution has no psychological origin? In that case, how does it originate? How can anything that human beings do have any other than a psychological origin? Or do the words mean that the institution has no psychological consequences?—The 'sociological point of view' is bought out very clearly by Ogburn in 'Technology and Sociology' (1938), *Social Forces*, **17**: 'Psychology is of great sociological importance in regard to changing social institutions, but as a study of the effect of the change, not as a cause of the change. Human beings react to the contraceptive by having fewer children and hence by having less responsibility in rearing them . . .' etc. I should like to enquire whether the contraceptive invented itself. But Ogburn is fully justified in asking: 'Can biology or psychology give us an explanation not of the existence of an institution but of its change?' Yes, we can. All psychological solutions of our conflict situations are unsatisfactory and must therefore always be succeeded by other attempts. Thus introjections alternate with projections, one mechanism after the other is utilized in the work of defence and every id re-inforcement is countered by an ego re-inforcement. Cf. Anna Freud, *op. cit.*

[72] Fenichel, *ibid.*

originated because people for unconscious reasons needed a fæces-corpse symbol. Instead money was made necessary only by the the development of an economic system that had reached a certain stage. The same economic development has also influenced the instinctual life. A task set by reality can only be performed with the aid of a certain instinctual structure ; conversely with money once in existence, its very presence alters the instinctual structure. . . . The social institutions that confront a generation act upon it as determining environmental influences. The biological structure itself has developed from the interplay of earlier structures and earlier experiences. Now, however, how have the social institutions themselves originated ? Was it not, in the final analysis, *through human beings who were attempting to satisfy their own needs ?* Yes, these individuals came into relationships with one another. But such relationships became external realities, which operate further, and the individuals who have created them can no longer escape from them.' [73]

I should like to ask what needs ? Have we not learnt from every individual whom we have analysed that man is not actuated by rational motives but that he rationalizes his unconscious trends ? I use the word ' rationalizes ' here in two senses : the usual one of an alleged rational motivation and that of gradually becoming rational, that is, of a successive transformation of id energies into ego energies. Surely Fenichel is not such a die-hard conservative as to regard every human institution as rational in the absolute sense ? Anthropologists are more psycho-analytical in this respect. Thus Kroeber, when he declares that ultimately the explanation of collective phenomena must always be sought in *psychology*,[74] or Lowie, when he emphasizes the *irrational* in man as opposed to the animal world,[75] is more in keeping with psycho-analytical thought than Fenichel in this paper. However, let us for the sake of argument assume that man really evolves his remarkably complicated social institutions on the basis of rational needs.[76] If this were true, we should ask why the chimpanzee has not got the same needs, why we have no chimpanzee banks or stock exchanges. After all, the environment was exactly the same for the anthropoid apes ; and it is clear enough that man has transformed his own

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[73] Fenichel, *op. cit.*, 93. My italics.

[74] Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923), 325.

[75] Lowie, *op. cit.*, 293 f.

[76] Though how anybody could prove this is more than I can see.

environment on the basis of an eternal repetition and variation of patterns based on his prolonged infancy. It is hardly necessary to explain to Fenichel that egoism in human beings may be, and probably always is, a complicated network of anxiety, object-seeking trends, secondarily reinforced narcissism and many other factors. It is, therefore, clear that, whatever economic or social systems man has created, man is the measure of all things, and that we must explain human institutions as based on human nature and not human nature as based on human institutions.[77] In a secondary sense, of course, the nature of the individual is modified by the institutions he has to live up to, but these institutions themselves only represent the petrified strivings of past generations of human beings. Thus our infancy, that is, our dependence on other human beings, is prolonged not only in our own life, but also into the past of our species. We have innumerable parents who condition our individual lives, not so much by biological heritage, as by the social institutions that represent their conflict situations. It may be added in this connection that this transformation of id forces into ego forces explains what we call human progress. It has often been remarked that human progress consists in the conquest of nature, whereas it is doubtful whether there is any progress in the conquest of our endopsychic world. We may leave the second half of the sentence a moot point for the present, but I think we can explain the conquest of nature. It is due to the fundamental function of the ego, which consists in attaining a synthesis. It is by means of this ever-increasing synthesis of our infantile phantasies and our environment that we are gradually transforming nature and re-creating it in our own image.

The synthesizing function of the ego may also manifest itself in another way. A situation is imposed upon the individual by the environment and this is secondarily libidinized by the ego. That is, the situation is supplied by the environment, but the capital for dealing with this situation is derived from the id. This situation, showing the pure 'environment-id' contrast, is probably more characteristic of early phases of evolution. It would also apply to the later phases, if we regard human-made environment (society) as equivalent to geo-

[77] A paper by Fenichel himself (if I understand it correctly) fulfills these requirements, because it explains social class on the basis of infantile omnipotence and the displacement of this omnipotence to the parents: Fenichel, 'Über Trophäe und Triumph' (1939), *Int. Z. Psychoanal. Imago*, **24**, 258.

graphical environment, and this would be the process envisaged by Fenichel. But there is this important difference: that the social environment situation is really an interaction with other human beings and therefore determined more decisively by the infantile (pre-Œdipus or Œdipus) situation.

Finally, we probably accomplish our conquest of reality through another channel. We may here take the views of English psycho-analysts as our starting point, according to which the psyche is originally an organ for falsifying perception, for modifying reality till it becomes acceptable to the ego. However, we must assume an increasing tendency to be disillusioned by our illusions and consequently an increasing development of reality testing. The satisfaction derived from hallucination is after all different from a real satisfaction of a need, and this something that is missing will act as a *vis a tergo* to induce a flight to reality. We become realists because our ideals are not realized. Although this waning faith in our phantasies is always bolstered up again and again in denials and over-compensations, we are gradually driven towards reality and we can enjoy our phantasies only when they appear in the disguise of realities. And thus we have created a phantastic reality in which our phantasies survive.

6. Individual Analysis and Culture Analysis

The question might be asked whether, if we have found the latent significance of a social phenomenon in the analysis of a single individual, we are justified in assuming that this latent meaning was also the origin of the institution. In analysing patients who have seen the ceremony of the *kapparah* fowl (the modern Jewish form of the ancient scapegoat) performed in their childhood, we often find that the sin transmitted to the fowl is sexuality or that the ceremony itself represents the primal scene. Here, for instance, is the dream of a bank employee undergoing a character analysis. *The patient sees a series of minute photographs. They are dancing girls—one big photograph looks like the director of his bank. He has various erotic phantasies; finally a red-headed girl with only one leg, then a woman with legs drawn up, very thin, like the legs of a chicken.* He remembers buying the *kapparah* chicken for the Day of Atonement, the woman who sold the chicken, and his desire to look under the woman's skirt, how at the age of ten he opened a door once when staying with his cousin and found her in intercourse with her boy friend. Then he talks again about the

kapparah ceremony and says that the head of the rooster when cut off looks just like that of his bank manager.

Similar primal scene dreams or projections of the libidinal strivings to the *kapparah* cock or hen occur in the dreams of other patients. In a dream published by Weiss a big *kapparah* cock symbolized the father, a small one the son, and beside the big cock there was seminal fluid.[78] I have shown that the scapegoat sent to Azazel in the desert represented the penis, just like the cock which took his place afterwards.[79] In this case, therefore, as also in the case of the phylacteries, it can be shown that the latent meaning to-day is the same as the latent meaning several thousand years ago.[80] In carrying out an analytical investigation of an initiation ceremony in Central Australia I have used this method extensively. The dreams of the initiators contained valuable hints regarding the latent meaning of the ceremony.[81] In one case we have individuals who are actually living in a ceremonial world, in the other only persons who have seen the last survivals of the ritual in their childhood. The result is much the same. However, this need not be the case. In a paper on the dragon myth I have been able to show that the latent content of the myth has also a history : new wine has been poured into old bottles. Yet the old wine also remains in the bottle, and, in a case of dragon phobia which I have analysed, I found in this single person in modern life all the latent elements that are stratified in the secular evolution of the myth.[82] On the other hand I can also show that totemism may mean one thing in a given area (Normanby Island) but that the totem animal in a certain dream of a given individual may mean something different. The analysis of the individual helps to understand the culture he lives in, but, in order to attain certainty, it must go hand in hand with the analysis of non-individual data.

Another question is how we can make sure that whatever we find in analysing a certain institution among any primitive group to-day is also the origin of that institution. It is quite true that we cannot be sure of this in an absolute sense, but this is as near as we can get to psychological origins.

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[78] Weiss, ' Totemmaterial in einem Traume ' (1914), *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, **2**, 163.

[79] Róheim, *Animism, Magic and the Divine King* (1930), 334.

[80] Cf. Eder, ' Die jüdischen Gebetsriemen ' (1933), *Imago*, **19**, 473.

[81] Róheim, *The Riddle of the Sphinx* (1934), 112, 116.

[82] Róheim, ' The Dragon and the Hero ' (1940), *Amer. Imago*, **1**, 40 ff.

7. Summary

The argument of the present paper may be summarized as follows :

1. Culture or sublimations in a group are evolved through the same process as in the individual.

2. Cultural areas are conditioned by the typical infantile situation in each area.

3. Human culture as a whole is the consequence of our prolonged infancy.

4. Typically human forms of adjustment are derived from the infantile situation.

5. Our conquest of nature is due to the synthetic function of the ego.

6. Psycho-analytic interpretations of culture should always be ego plus id interpretations.

7. The interpretations of cultural elements through individual analysis is probably correct, but should be combined with the analysis of anthropological data.

BOOK REVIEWS

Fear and Courage. By Edward Glover. (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1940. Pp. 128. Price, 6*d.*)

This is a really excellent production. It must be a far from easy thing to address an uninformed and diverse audience on these themes at such length. And there are few unnecessary words, for Dr. Glover has managed to express in the compass allotted to him an enormous number of helpful ideas and a fill of practical advice. These are all expounded with his accustomed fluency and there can be no doubt about his getting them home. He is at equal ease in the colloquialisms of the bar room as in expressing the more dignified reflections to which he constantly recalls the reader, but he evidently shares the chariness of the British, on which he pointedly comments, to voice aloud passionate attachments to any ideal.

Dr. Glover pins his faith to re-assurance. While urging that both fears and hatreds be frankly admitted and recognized, he would deal with those of unconscious origin rather by discounting them as mere relics of the distant past (even of an ancestral past) than by encouraging any investigation of their real nature. Opinions among psycho-analysts may differ on this matter, but it must not be forgotten that in such a case writer and reader are not in personal contact with each other and that the former has to weigh the possible good with the probable harm were he to contemplate the blind prodding of the latter's unconscious.

The real theme of the book is morale, and on it Dr. Glover has many pertinent and illuminating things to say. He begins by maintaining that the sustenance or destruction of morale is every nation's secret weapon and not only Germany's as blazoned to the world by Hitler in *Mein Kampf.* He then goes on to say : ' The real difficulty about British morale is not that it is bad. The morale of free men is the finest in the world. But in times of war it suffers from one serious disadvantage. *People who enjoy peace and comparative freedom under democracy are more inclined to divide up their energies and allegiances.*' The British morale is therefore a peace-time morale, whereas under a dictatorship it is already unified, very artificially, it is true, but nevertheless unified. The question then arises of how to rally our scattered allegiances, i.e. our usual interests, hobbies, loyalties, etc., to one co-ordinate goal. For this purpose passive agreement is not enough : ' Defence will consolidate a nation ; only a crusade will carry it to victory.'

So much for the Introduction. Dr. Glover then deals in detail with such topics as ' On Being Afraid ', Rumour, Suspicion, Spy-Mania, Hatred, Guilt, Conscience and the like. But whether he is considering the petty problems of the harassed housewife or those of an anxious city-worker his theme remains the same. ' It is as much the duty of a civilian to keep

his morale bright as it is the duty of a soldier to keep his rifle-barrel clean.' Real knowledge, purposive action and preparedness to meet emergencies are the agencies with which he would combat 'unreal' fear, or rather enable the individual to distinguish between real and unreal fear. He insists that the only way to demoralize a people is by weakening the mutual bonds on which their morale is based and he makes a number of cogent remarks in this connection on the varieties and significance of suspicion and distrust. Speaking of the individual he writes: 'The cure of bad morale depends on the case. If the sufferer is merely over-nervous or if his morale is lowered by hardships due to the war, it is no good bullying him. As far as possible his unreal fears should be reasoned and his hardships lightened until he can regain his firmness of purpose. But if, behind his fear, there is a more selfish or malicious motive, a desire to hurt others because he, himself, feels unsafe, he must be reminded that in war-time malice and selfishness are as bad for morale as desertion in the face of the enemy. He must be made to realize that bad morale is nothing more or less than feeling and behaving just exactly as Hitler has planned he should.' He adds, however, a warning against attempts to improve morale by admonition or disapproval. On the subject of rumour Dr. Glover says well: 'When a man's life is at stake, it does not seem a hardship to put all witnesses on oath. When the morale of our country is at stake, it is surely no hardship to insist that before passing on rumours we should ask ourselves the single question: "Would you say this if you were on oath?"'

The sources of Quislingism in dissatisfaction, vengefulness and so on are clearly described and Dr. Glover asserts that 'The Quisling is in most cases a Gosling in disguise. However boldly he may claim that he is the true patriot, he is usually a man suffering from a strong feeling of inferiority.'

Many will think the best part of the book that contained in the two final chapters on 'War Aims' and 'The Bed-Rock of Morale' respectively. Dr. Glover is led willy-nilly to pursue his study of morale into that of our motives for fighting and our essential aims in doing so. Here one cannot do his exposition justice by a summary or quotation, but it may be remarked that the aims he mentions of preserving oneself and one's loved objects (home and people) from violence, of resisting aggression against cherished institutions or helpless people and of preserving truth and upholding justice would correspond in psycho-analytical terminology with the desire to preserve one's internal good objects and to protect one's love-objects.

It is good to hear that this useful book has been a popular success and that hence it is doubtless achieving the aims it set itself.

E. J.

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The Integration of the Personality. By Carl G. Jung. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. 313. Price 15s.)

Jung's attention was drawn to the literature of alchemy by his interest in a special type of dream sequence. He illustrates this type by quoting a short series from a woman patient and a longer sequence obtained from a young man. He thinks these dreams express in symbols the occurrence in the dreamer of a psychological process of integration that he calls 'individuation'. The arresting feature about the symbols used and the serial story told in them is their close agreement with the imagery used by the alchemists. Jung therefore concludes that the sincere alchemists were never concerned with actual transmutation, e.g. of concrete lead into concrete gold, but with 'individuation', 'the unconscious centralizing processes that form the personality' (p. 276). 'By this I do not mean to say that we have in any way come closer to the secret of this process, but we see it in a new light, through the medium of symbols, clearly enough to make an attempt to save the honour of ancient alchemy' (p. 268). He thinks the alchemist undertook laboratory work because in so doing he had psychic experiences which he 'projected' into the chemical processes (presumably in much the same way as a crystal gazer sees visions in a crystal).

It is impossible to go into detail here. Briefly, the initial stages of the psychological process are often represented by a journey (e.g. a going down to the water) in the course of which great dangers are faced and significant persons or animals encountered. The climax takes the form of a 'mandala' ('magic circle') symbol. These 'circles' are, as Jung says, among the oldest religious symbols of mankind. Ritual mandalas are centred on divine figures, Shiva or Buddha or some symbol denoting the union of divine powers. For the alchemist this centre has some of the qualities of the 'philosophers' stone' and of the 'elixir vitæ'. The 'tetrad' (squaring the circle) usually appears in some form. The flower is an alternative version of the circle (the jewel in the heart of the lotus). In the individual dream-mandala Jung takes the centre to represent 'a psychic centre of the personality that is not identical with the "I"' (p. 128): i.e. not identical with the Freudian conscious or reality ego. Hence mandala dreams indicate the attainment by the dreamer of the psychic goal of 'individuation', the emergence of 'personality' through the integration of consciousness and unconscious about a centre not the 'I'.

Jung treats the subject almost entirely from the male angle. It is however a point of interest that in a mandala dream of the woman patient (Plate IV, facing p. 37) the head of the serpent penetrates the sphere and is in direct contact with the central oval of a structure very like the womb with its companion ovaries. This is followed by a dream (said to indicate inner illumination) in which the sphere is closed about a tetrad of shell-like

sphères round the centre and the serpent is free below (signifying that it has been accepted as an objective world principle).

The literature of alchemy is so complicated and difficult of access that the material presented in this book is of real interest. It is Jung's theory and his metaphysical interpretations that psycho-analysts will find unsatisfactory and obscurantist. No analyst would think of denying the validity of all the grades of mystical experience as experience ; it is the mystic's interpretation of his experience that is open to question and his translation of the language of his heart into the language of his head that we cannot accept uncritically if we are to deserve the name of scientists. We know that there is no necessary correspondence between subjective certainty of any degree and objective fact. We know too that hypotheses such as Jung's collective unconscious or the racial sub-conscious of the Buddhist rest finally upon subjective certainty. On the other hand we know that all the living beings found on this earth are individual organisms, existing truly in very intimate relations with their environment, but none the less self-maintaining systems with boundaries, and that all the minds of whose existence we have adequate proof are embodied minds. Must we not as scientists assume that our minds are individual from their beginning at any rate so long as this assumption works ? So far it has served us well, although we know we are only in the pioneer stages of understanding mind and that the psyche holds many vital secrets from us. Just because we recognize that our conscious intelligence is more hampered in dealing with mental than with physical phenomena and that our egos constitute such a restricted part of our total mentality, we must be doubly cautious about hypotheses that obviously satisfy strong emotional needs. It is not difficult to imagine that an expansion of the ego of greater degree than we often observe clinically might give subjective certainty of cosmic consciousness.

Jung himself says that ' individuation ' rites and conceptions can be easily translated into the infantile language of Freudian symbolism, but he thinks such a process childish. But it is just our laborious ' infantility ' that has taught us how persistently we create gods and devils in our own images, and how urgent the ' need ' for these creations may be. It has shown us too how much potentiality for living can remain locked in very personal and specific infantile adaptations, lost to the ego until recovered by the detailed re-living and re-integration that is the process of analysis. Naturally we shall not deny that integration varies in degree, or that it may occur spontaneously, or as the result of religious or other disciplines, with greater completeness than we ordinarily expect to achieve in our consulting-rooms. Indeed we might quite safely regard mandala symbolism as portraying an economic ideal, namely an integration of conscious and unconscious ego-organization of such totality that almost the full power

of the id could be utilized by the personality. Jung however has no use for the super-ego as such and completely misses the significance of the concept of the id. He still maintains that Freud's unconscious is exclusively of a personal (i.e. ego-derivative) nature and that it has significance as a function only because it is a gathering place of forgotten and suppressed contents. At present we are all much exercised over those 'imagines' that Jung distinguishes as 'the anima', 'the shadow', etc., only we call them 'introjected objects' and not 'archetypes'. It does not seem to us necessary to assume that these 'archetypes' lead an objective existence in a collective unconscious in order to account for their wide distribution in the race. Whatever opinion we hold about the difficult problems of psychic heredity, it is no more and no less astonishing that the human mind should function along characteristic lines than that the human body should conform to a common plan.

This book was published in 1940, so that two remarks about 'leaders' may startle us. Commenting on Goethe's stanza 'Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder, Sei nur die Persönlichkeit', Jung writes: 'It thus fittingly recognizes the historical fact that the great liberating deeds of world history have come from leading personalities and never from the inert mass that is secondary at all times and needs the demagogue if it is to move at all. The pæan of the Italian nation is addressed to the personality of the Duce, and the dirges of other nations lament the absence of great leaders.' (P. 281.) In a later footnote he writes that, since 1932, 'Germany, too, has found its leader.'

Marjorie Brierley.

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Sex Morality To-morrow. By Kenneth Ingram. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1940. Pp. 173. Price, 6*s*.)

The author in this interestingly written book confesses candidly that it is probably impossible to predict with complete objectivity the future of such a delicate matter as sex morality. He compromises, therefore, by admitting that his own wishes enter into his prediction and by at the same time giving reasons in support of them. The book, nevertheless, appears to be unduly personal in tone and to disdain the help that many branches of science are in a position to proffer. Freud's name, for example, appears nowhere in the book nor are the findings of psycho-analysis referred to, although such a book would not have been written had they never been made. When, for instance, the author asserts that 'the sex-impulse is a force of such intensity that it cannot be suppressed without causing deep psychological effects', he goes no further into the matter. Again, when in discussing whether there is a natural instinct against incest he descants on the artificial prejudice against it and adds that 'this

instinct, however, is natural in so far as it is due to a deep-seated consciousness that mating between persons closely related results in race-deterioration. To a large extent this consciousness is scientifically justified. In many English rural districts where interbreeding has been common the general features which become evident are a devitalization and a lessening of energy.' But it is not perceived here how prejudice is assuming a pseudo-objective guise and that the whole matter can be discussed quite impartially by taking into account the works of Hogben and similar writers on the subject.

On the subject of divorce and its bearing on the upbringing of children the author rightly points out that the real problem to be tackled is not so much the final question of whether to divorce or not but the prior one concerning the cause of the unhappy marriage, since that has the fateful effect on the children whether the parents decide to divorce or not. His own prophylactic for unhappy marriages is pre-marital experience, including trial-marriages. As he himself points out, the central theme running through his book is the importance of combining sexuality with affection and the undesirability of purely carnal experiences.

On the subject of contraception the author gives the fairest and most convincing arguments we have read against the views of the Roman Catholic church. He gets out of his depth, however, when he proceeds to discuss the matter in connection with the population problem. Here he seems insufficiently aware both of the political and economic import of the question and also of the difficulty of bringing individual wishes into relation with social needs in such a personal sphere. He airily asserts: ' What is certain in any case, is that the society of the coming age will carefully regulate the size of the population from time to time.' What the iron Nazi *régime* has not been able to accomplish in spite of all its endeavours will not prove easy in any future society. The author is wholeheartedly in favour of contraceptive methods being made universally accessible, but he is opposed to artificial abortion.

There is a chapter on ' Sex in Schools ', i.e. in public schools, but the matter of sex-education before this period is practically ignored. Psychoanalysts know well how hard it was to counter the prevailing belief that sexual life begins only at puberty. It will be news to most of us to learn that anyone could have believed that it did not begin even at this age. We are assured by our author that it is a mistake to believe that the sexual nature becomes active only in adult life; on the contrary this often happens in youths of sixteen or seventeen and sometimes even as early as puberty! He holds the modern conventional view that masturbation, having no harmful physical effects, has harmful mental ones only because of the shame artificially attached to it. When, however, excessive masturbation has taken place ' an intelligent schoolmaster then has a private

talk with the boy—private not because the subject is shameful, but because it is intimately personal—and advises him to regulate the habit by a fixed period.' The author is in favour of co-educational schools and of sexual activities being permitted there. This is, of course, on the strict understanding that his rule of sexuality and love being combined is adhered to. With such activity, therefore, it will become the duty of the schoolmaster to see that the game is being played according to the rules and we must say that we do not envy him his task.

It is on the subject of homosexuality that the author becomes most expansive. He rightly distinguishes between passive and active homosexuality among men and evidently is more sympathetic towards the latter type. He makes no finer discrimination, however, and certainly overgeneralizes when he says: 'So far as my own observation goes he is usually sensitive and amenable to the charms of female society, and in some ways is peculiarly in affinity to it because he approaches it from a non-sexual standpoint. The homosexual mysogynist is a rare phenomenon.' He doubts there being any particular psychological cause of homosexuality or that it can be in any proper sense regarded as an abnormality. On the whole his view appears to be that in the future homosexual activities will be not merely tolerated socially, but fully and openly accepted as representing a useful deviation that will add to the richness of life. It is not surprising that, in the final chapter, the author should dwell on the importance of bi-sexual types and predict that they will become commoner in the future through greater assimilation of the sexes. We should have thought it a safer prediction that the future—at least until profound changes come about through the application of psycho-analysis in infancy—will repeat the familiar past in showing alternative waves of heightened sex-differentiation and sex-assimilation.

E. J.

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The Physiology of Sex. By Kenneth Walker. (Allen Lane, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1940. Pp. xi + 157. Price, 6*d*.)

After animadverting in his preface on the spate of superfluous books on sex the author proceeds to add one more. It is of the familiar class of those whose writer subscribes to the odd belief that an adequate knowledge of anatomy and embryology qualifies him to unravel the most subtle of human problems, namely those concerning the relations between the sexual impulse and the mind. Such writers have, it is true, the advantage of simple views. Thus on the first page of his preface he announces that: 'We have got rid of the ridiculous notion that sexuality is essentially immoral.' How easy it all seems. No wonder that the author is able to deal with the baffling problem of masturbation at puberty by merely

informing the boy ' that it would be better to reduce, or even to give up entirely, this form of self-gratification. Now that he is approaching manhood the things of childhood can be put aside, and it is as easy to give up this habit as it is to give up thumb-sucking.'

After two valuable chapters on the biology of sex the author plunges *in medias res*. To him it follows from his biological considerations that the sexual impulse is stronger and more compulsive in the male. What dominates the female mind is the desire for offspring and for her sexuality is nothing but a means to this end, so that ' the enjoyment of what may be termed undiluted sexuality may be regarded as the prerogative of the male ', and ' not only in her physical but also in her psychological make-up everything in a woman is sacrificed to the function of motherhood.' In spite of the primordial nature of the sexual impulse, which the author had stressed in his biological considerations, he paradoxically writes later : ' The strength of sexuality varies as much in different individuals as does the capacity to enjoy music. For some men and women sexuality and all that it implies holds little interest ; at no time in their lives have they given it more than a passing thought.'

We have often been told that various matters, above all religious beliefs, are outside the sphere of science, but it is still rather surprising to learn that ' Science does not attempt to explain love, but only deals with the physical change associated with it.'

The Austrian philologist Sperber's views on the sexual origin of speech are quoted, that author being, however, transmogrified into ' the Swedish philosopher Sperber '. The main part of the book deals in an *ex cathedra* fashion with such topics as ' Success and Failure in Marriage ', ' Romantic Love ', ' Preparation for Marriage ', ' Divorce ', ' The Social Problems Created by Sex ', ' Sex and Education ', and so on.

Perversions present no serious problem to the author. Naturally he accepts the common medical assumption that homosexuality is a congenital physical condition and sympathizes with its victims because ' even if they have the desire to be like the majority of their fellows, no known medical treatment is likely to have any effect '. Bi-sexuals are also in a sad case since ' Marriage is, of course, out of the question, even when the patient is bi-sexual. . . . Moreover, there exists a strong argument against marriage, even when it is possible. It is almost certain that there is a strong hereditary factor in inversion, and for this reason procreation is undesirable.' Concerning a still commoner condition we learn that ' the exhibitionist is satisfied with the mere act of self-exhibition and with the emotional reaction which it produces . . . he does not even appear to be sexually excited by the act.' Nor do the more symbolic forms of perversion bother the author. ' Another form of sexual attack for which a man may find himself in the dock is the cutting off of female hair. . . . The hair-

despoiler's passion is very easily explained. Human hair is a common fetish ; for the hair of the beloved is the feature that is the most universally noted apart from her eyes. . . . As a rule there is no sadistic element in the cutter's act ; he is a pure fetishist who intends no harm to his victim. The despoiler is not an ill-intentioned man, in spite of the annoyance he causes. On medical examination he will usually be found to be of a nervous temperament and to come from a family subject to nervous breakdown, alcoholism and other manifestations of nervous instability.'

Four pages are devoted to the topic of sublimation. The modern meaning of the word is not given nor any hint that it dates from Freud. Indeed it is noteworthy that the author in quoting the works from which his information has been obtained does not include one by any psychoanalyst ; in fact he descends to regarding P. D. Ouspensky as an authority. There is, however, one passage on Freud which is well worth quoting : ' Much of the confusion that has arisen as the result of Freud's teaching would have been prevented had he avoided the use of that ill-chosen word " libido ". Libido suggests libidinous, a word closely linked with sexuality. If, however, libido be taken in a wider sense to mean the " psychic energy " of Jung, or the " élan vital " of Bergson, a saner view of childhood would have been retained. The tendency of children to play with their genitals would not then have been regarded as a precocious manifestation of sexuality. . . . It is neither advantageous nor accurate, then, to call such infantile attempts at sensual gratification sexual. . At that age they have no sexual significance whatever, although later in life they may acquire this. Even by the time of puberty some sexual content may have been added to these activities, but in the nursery they are devoid of sexual significance.'

Sexuology is thus restored to its primitive stage of nescient innocence. After this we are completely bewildered by a passage in a subsequent chapter on sex and education : ' Sex is so inextricably interwoven into the warp and woof of our behaviour that it may be said to be life itself. This being so it begins in the cradle, and only ends in the grave. Why therefore this special talk at adolescence, as though before that age it had never existed ? '

E. J.

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Revelation and the Unconscious. By R. Scott Frayn. (The Epworth Press, London, 1940. Pp. 240. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*.)

This book is hard to review elsewhere than in a theological periodical, but it may be said to illustrate vividly the contrast between the subjective approach of philosophy to a subject and the objective one of science. In discussing, for instance, whether the unconscious has—or rather ought to

have—a moral element the author states: 'Dr. Hughes, rightly as we think, refuses to allow any such de-moralization of the unconscious.' Again, when the same writer suggests that the spiritual side of man should be placed in a super-conscious realm of the mind rather than in the unconscious one the author dissents: 'It is this latter course we should prefer to take, interpreting the unconscious in the deeper sense.' In other words, the conclusions to be arrived at are to be dictated by the preferences of these reverend gentlemen without any reference at all to the actual state of affairs. The idea that knowledge, experience or investigation might have any bearing on the problem under discussion seems completely foreign to the author, who throughout the whole book makes no reference whatever to what investigation has disclosed concerning the actual contents of the unconscious mind.

Although no description is given of any of Freud's work on the subject, beyond stigmatizing his conception of the unconscious as 'a kind of devil's cauldron, exhaling evil vapours and pouring forth evil powers', there are many passing references made to him. We are told that the 'Freudian view of the unconscious regards it as so essentially a morbid region of the mind that the religious psychologist has come to suppose yet another, higher level of the mind, to account for correspondingly higher and better thoughts and impulses.' 'The fact is that where the exclusively selfish aspect of mental and psychic quality is a feature of the unconscious we have not really reached the fundamental level of the mind. We are only in the region of the secondary, individual area of repression. We need to go deeper still to find that region of the mind which is universal.' The author's own view of this so-called secondary unconscious is adumbrated by his repeated designation of it as psychic refuse which consciousness is trying to evacuate. The deepest layer of the unconscious is, according to the author, that which is in direct contact with God and which transmits His revelations.

We are given a new definition of repression. 'Repression may be described as a process which blocks the channel of communication between the human consciousness and the divine, in the first place, but it also inevitably corrupts and contaminates such impulse.' In fact, one of the chief troubles of the world at present is 'the apparently unwitting repression of the divine'.

Since the author consistently misrepresents Freud's view of the unconscious as consisting of something secondarily extruded from consciousness in contrast with Jung's nobler conception of a primary, universal and fundamental unconscious, it is natural that he should favour the latter. But, as was indicated at the outset, the whole book is on a plane quite remote from psychological reality.

E. J.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[*Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.*]

A. BOOKS

Practical Neurological Diagnosis. By R. Glen Spurling. (Second Edition.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas. London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1940. Pp. xi + 239. Price, 22*s.*)

Principles of Abnormal Psychology: the Dynamics of Psychic Illness. By A. H. Maslow and Béla Mittelmann. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1941. Pp. x + 638. Price, $3.50.)

Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique. By Otto Fenichel. Translated by David Brunswick. (New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., 1941. Pp. 130.)

Schriften aus dem Nachlass (1892–1938). By Sigm. Freud. (London: Imago Publishing Co. Ltd. 1941. Pp. ix. + 161. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The Myth of the Mind. By Frank Kenyon. (The Thinker's Library, No. 85.) (London: Watts & Co. 1941. Pp. ix + 115. Price, 1*s.* 3*d.*)

The Traumatic Neuroses of War. By Abram Kardiner. (Psychosomatic Medicine Monograph, II–III.) (Washington: National Research Council. 1941. Pp. x + 258. Price, $3.00.)

Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. By Norbert Elias. (Vol. II.) (Basel: Haus zum Falken. 1939. Pp. 490.)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).
British Medical Journal (London).
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic (Topeka).
Journal of Criminal Psychopathology (New York).
Man (London).
Medical Record (New York).
Psychiatry (Washington).
Psychological Abstracts (Providence).
Psychosomatic Medicine (Washington).
Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatria (Lima).
The British Journal of Medical Psychology (London).
The Journal of the American Medical Association (Chicago).
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).
The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).
Tokio Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse (Tokyo).

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

[As indicated in the previous Bulletin it has been thought desirable to publish reports of the activities of Branch Societies as they become available. The membership lists, however, will be published in as complete a form as possible at the end of the year. Owing to Dr. Bibring's transfer to America it has not been possible for him on this occasion to edit the Training Report.]

I. REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIETIES

AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

1939–1940

May 19 *to* 22, 1940. Dr. G. Zilboorg : ' Ethico-Sociological Implications of Psychoanalysis.'

Dr. T. M. French : ' Some Psychoanalytic Applications of the Psychological Field Concept.'

Dr. R. Sterba : ' The Abuse of Interpretation.'

Round Table Discussion : ' Problems of Training.' Drs. S. Rado, F. Alexander, S. G. Biddle, A. A. Brill, F. Deutsch, T. M. French, L. B. Hill, A. Kardiner, M. R. Kaufman, L. S. Kubie, D. M. Levy, G. Zilboorg.

Dr. L. S. Kubie : ' The Repetitive Core of Neurosis.'

Dr. K. A. Menninger : ' Unconscious Factors in the Choice of Medicine as a Profession.'

Dr. M. Jarvis : ' Repetition Compulsion Leading to Criminal Behavior.'

Dr. M. E. Romm : ' Compulsion Factors in Exhibitionism.'

Dr. R. P. Knight : ' Intimidation of Others as a Defense Against Anxiety.'

Dr. B. Warburg : ' Defenses Against Oral Aggression in an Anal Character.'

Dr. E. Sterba : ' Homesickness and the Mother's Breast.'

Dr. L. E. Bartemeier : ' Micropsia.'

Round Table Discussion : ' The Evolution of Psychoanalytic Trends.'

Joint Session with the Section on Psychoanalysis of the American Psychiatric Association :

Dr. G. E. Daniels, Dr. E. S. Tauber (by invitation) : ' A Dynamic Approach to the Study of Replacement Therapy in Cases of Castration.'

Dr. S. Rado : ' A Critical Examination of the Concept of Bisexuality.'

Drs. F. Deutsch, M. R. Kaufman, H. L. Blumgart (by invitation) : ' Teaching Psychiatry in the General Hospital.'

Dr. A. Kardiner : ' Freud's Indications for Future Developments in the General Theory of Neuroses.'

Joint Session with the Section of Psychoanalysis of the American Psychiatric Association :

Dr. H. T. Carmichael : ' A Psychoanalytic Study of Eunuchoidism.'

Dr. B. Glueck : ' Further Considerations of the Psychodynamics of Shock Therapy.'

Drs. M. L. Miller, H. V. McLean : ' The Emotional Origin of Palpitation and Extra Systoles.'

Dr. M. Grotjahn : ' Critical Evaluation of Brief Psychotherapy on a Psychoanalytic Basis.'

BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

November 10. Memorial Meeting in Honour of Sigmund Freud. Dr. I. H. Coriat, Dr. R. Waelder : Discussion on ' Moses and Monotheism.'

1940

January 1. Dr. J. J. Michaels : ' Persistent Enuresis and Psychopathy.'

January 19. Dr. L. S. Kubie : ' A Critical Analysis of the Concept of a Repetition Compulsion.'

March 13. Dr. Frederick Rosenheim : ' Flight from Home—Some Episodes in the Life of Herman Melville.'

April 10. Dr. W. L. Woods (by invitation) : ' An Investigation into the Nature of Symbolic Expression in Cartoons.'

CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

September 30. Freud Memorial Meeting. Dr. H. V. McLean : ' Sigmund Freud—Introductory Remarks.'

Dr. F. Alexander : ' Sigmund Freud, The Man.'

Dr. R. R. Grinker : ' Sigmund Freud, a Few Reminiscences of a Personal Contact.'

October 14. Dr. H. Davis (by invitation) : ' Electroencephalograms in Psychiatry.'

October 28. Dr. G. L. Harrington (by invitation) : ' Learning in Psychoanalysis.'

November 11. Dr. R. Sterba : ' Contribution to the Musical Problem.' Dr. M. Grotjahn : ' Ferdinand the Bull—Psychoanalytic Remarks about a Modern Totem Animal.'

December 2. Mrs. E. P. Fuchs-Heilpern (by invitation) : ' Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Stuttering.'

December 16. Dr. M. L. Miller : ' Psychological Factors in Two Cases of Skin Disease.'

1940

January 18. Dr. G. W. Wilson : ' A Prophetic Dream of Abraham Lincoln.' Dr. J. Steinfeld : ' A Short Contribution to the Problem of Artistic Creation.'

February 3. Dr. R. Waelder (by invitation) : ' Psychoanalysis and History with Reflections on Freud's " Moses ".'

February 16. Dr. R. R. Grinker, Dr. H. V. McLean : ' The Course of a Depression under Psychotherapy and Metrazol Treatment.'

March 15. Dr. C. Van der Heide : ' A Case of Pollakiuria Nervosa.'

March 30. Dr. H. T. Carmichael : ' Psychodynamic Mechanisms in a Case of Male Eunuchoidism.'

April 12. Dr. M. L. Miller, Dr. H. V. McLean : ' The Emotional Origin of Palpitation and Extra Systoles.'

April 26. Dr. J. H. Masserman : ' Psychodynamics of Anorexia and Vomiting.'

May 10. Dr. R. P. Knight (by invitation) : ' The Relationship of Latent Homosexuality to the Mechanism of Paranoid Delusions.'

NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

September 26. Memorial Meeting for Professor Sigmund Freud. Addresses by Drs. Brill, Federn, Jekels.

October 17. Dr. K. Horney : ' The Emphasis on Genesis in Freud's Thinking ; the Influence of the Genetic Viewpoint on Therapy and Practice, its Value and its Debatable Aspects.'

October 31. Dr. L. S. Kubie : ' A Critical Analysis of the Concept of a Repetition Compulsion.'

November 14. Dr. K. Horney : Continuation of previous paper.

November 28. Dr. B. Mittelmann : ' Affects and Gastric Function : Experimental Studies on Patients with Peptic Ulcers.'

December 12. Dr. A. Stern : ' Case Report of a Rigid Personality Psychoanalytically Treated.'

December 19. Dr. B. S. Robbins : ' The Structure of the Overt Homosexual Partnership.'

1940

January 9. Dr. F. Wittels : ' Phantoms of Omnipotence.'

January 30. Dr. K. Menninger (by invitation) : ' Psychoanalytic Psychiatry ; Its Theory and Practice.'

February 13. Dr. L. Jekels (by invitation) : ' Certain Aspects of Thinking in Psychoanalysis.'

February 27. Dr. R. Waelder (by invitation) : ' Recent Trends in Psychoanalysis.'

March 12. Dr. P. Greenacre : ' The Predisposition to Anxiety.'

March 26. Dr. L. J. Saul (by invitation) : ' The Psychological Setting of Some Attacks of Urticaria.'

April 9. Dr. I. Hendrick (by invitation) : ' Instincts and Ego during the Infantile Period.'

April 20. Dr. G. Zilboorg : ' The Sense of Reality.'

May 14. Dr. R. Mack Brunswick : ' The Pre-Œdipal Phase of the Libido Development.'

June 18. (Presentation of papers by candidates.) Dr. O. Knopf : ' An Operation not Calling for Immediate Attention during Analysis.' Dr. S. Keiser : ' A Phase in the Analysis of a Patient with Obsessive, Compulsive Symptomatology, and Features of Schizophrenia.'

PHILADELPHIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1940

March 9. Dr. L. B. Hill (by invitation) : ' Comments on the Subjective Value of Analysts' Theories.' Dr. L Dooley (by invitation) : ' The Sense of Time Used in Defense of Ego Integrity.'

TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

September 2. Dr. K. A. Menninger : ' Review of " Moses and Monotheism ".'

October 21. Dr. R. P. Knight : ' The Relationship of Latent Homosexual Wishes to the Mechanism of Paranoid Delusions.'

November 18. Freud Memorial Meeting. Dr. R. Grinker (read by Dr. W. C. Menninger) : ' Some Recollections Regarding Freud.' Dr. E. Weiss : ' Reminiscences About Freud.'

1940

January 3. Dr. F. Fromm-Reichmann (by invitation) : ' The Mother Rôle in the Family Group.'

January 20. Dr. E. Weiss : ' Internal Presuppositions for Our Relationships with Objects of the Outer World.'

February 24. Dr. L. Harrington : ' Changing Patients' Attitudes.'

March 23. Dr. D. W. Orr : ' Psychoanalytic Study of a Fraternal Twin.'

April 27. Dr. S. Allen : ' Pre-Analytic Work with a Hebephrenic.'

June 16. Dr. V. Weiss (by invitation) : ' Analysis of a Case of Erythrophobia.'

November 23. Dr. F. Alexander : ' The Voice of the Intellect is Soft.'

1941

January 25. Dr. J. C. Whitehorn (by invitation) : ' The Treatment of Schizophrenia.'

WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

October. Memorial Meeting to Sigmund Freud : Remarks by Drs. Hill, Dooley, Weigert-Vowinckel, Mrs. Peller. Dr. K. A. Menninger : ' Psychological Determinants in the Choice of Medicine as a Profession.'

November. Dr. R. Anderson : ' Observations Relative to the Theory of the Stages of the Development of the Libido.' Dr. A. B. Evans : ' Notes on the Analysis of an Alcoholic.'

December. Dr. E. Weigert, Dr. P. Wagner : ' Psychoanalytic Notes on Sleep and Convulsion Treatment in Functional Psychoses.'

1940

January. Dr. M. Jarvis : ' Repetition Compulsions Leading to Criminal Behavior : A Case Study.'

February. Dr. H. S. Sullivan : ' Some Facts About the Psychiatric Therapy of Schizophrenics.'

March. Dr. E. Fromm : ' The Psychology of the Normal Personality in our Culture.'

April. Dr. W. V. Silverberg : ' Prologue to the Study of the Jew and His Fellowmen.'

May. Dr. L. B. Hill : ' The Relation of Psychoanalytic Theories to the Personalities of Psychoanalysts.'

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1940

October 18. Discussion on ' The Psychological Effects of Air-Raids.' Opened by Mr. W. Schmideberg.

November 6. Dr. M. Schmideberg : ' Proof and Error in Psycho-Analytic Conclusions.'

November 20. Open Discussion on ' Means of Assessing the Relative Validity of Interpretations (With special reference to situations where interpretation of apparently identical clinical material varies widely

between either two individual analysts or two groups of analysts).' Led by Dr. E. Glover.

December 11. Dr. W. Hoffer: 'Analysis of a Post-Encephalitic Mental Disturbance.'

1941

January 15. Dr. E. Stengel: 'Some Considerations on Experiences During Internment.'

February 5. Dr. K. Friedlander: 'Charlotte Brontë. Study of a Masochistic Character Formation.'

March 5. Discussion on 'The Comparative Effect of War and Social Hardship on War-time Morale.' Opened by Dr. W. Hoffer.

March 19. Dr. M. Schmideberg: 'The Relative Validity of "Pre-Conscious" and "Deep" Interpretation.'

April 23. Dr. D. W. Winnicott: 'Observations on Asthma in an Infant and its Relation to Anxiety.'

May 28. Discussion on 'Changes in Analytic Technique Necessitated by War Conditions.' Opened by Dr. R. A. Macdonald.

June 18. Dr. M. Bálint: 'Reality Testing in a Case of Schizophrenic Hallucinations.'

INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1939

September 13. Mr. T. Sinha: 'Formation of Garo Clans.'

September 20. Discussion on the 'Interpretation of Psycho-Analytic Material by an Analyst under Training.' Opened by Dr. Bose.

September 27. Dr. G. Bose: 'Borderland Psychosis.'

October 4. Lt.-Col. O. Berkeley-Hill: 'Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Crime.'

November 29. Dr. G. Bose: 'Psycho-Analytic Interpretation of Animal Behaviour.'

December 6. Dr. E. G. Servadio: 'Identification and Conversion Phenomena by Clairvoyant Medium.'

December 13. Freud Commemoration Meeting. Dr. I. Sen (Delhi): 'Freud's Contribution to the Problem of Personal Development.' Dr. S. C. Chatterji (Calcutta): 'Freud on the Future of Religion.' Dr. S. C. Laha (Calcutta): 'Freud and the Future.' Dr. S. C. Mitra (Calcutta): 'Is the Psycho-Analytic Procedure Scientific?' Mr. H. P. Maiti (Calcutta): 'Freud and the Future of Psycho-Analysis.' Dr. G. Bose (Calcutta): 'An Aspect of Freudian Thought.' Dr. N. N. Sengupta (Lucknow): 'Freud's Contribution to General Psychology.' Mr. Pars Ram (Lahore): 'Sigmund Freud on War.' Dr. E. G. Servadio (Bombay): 'Freud's Contribution to Psychical Research.' Dr. I. Latif (Lahore):

'Freud : The Scientist.' Dr. C. N. Menon (Benares) : ' The Super-Ego.' Dr. S. L. Sarkar (Calcutta) : ' Sigmund Freud's View on the Psychology of War.' Mr. M. Z. Abdih (Bhagalpur) : ' Psycho-Analytic Sexology.' Dr. J. K. Sarkar (Mazuffarpur) : ' Freud's Conception of Man as Man.' Mr. M. V. Amrith (Madras) : ' Sigmund Freud and Literature.' Lt.-Col. O. Berkeley-Hill (Ranchi) : ' Sigmund Freud : A Personal Memory.' Dr. N. De (Calcutta) : ' Personal Reminiscences.' Mr. S. Ghosh (Calcutta) : ' Religion and the Future.' Mr. N. R. Biswas (Calcutta) : ' On Freud.' Mr. B. Burman (Dacca) : ' Freudiya Dipikaya satyar Sandhan ' (in Bengali).

1940

August 28. Mr. S. K. Bose : ' An Outsider's Reaction to Psycho-Analysis.'

September 3. Dr R. Ghosh : ' Psycho-Analysts in England.'

II. REPORT OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES

TRAINING INSTITUTES

Reports of the Training Organizations Recognized by the American Psychoanalytic Association

Boston Psychoanalytic Institute

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. William G. Barrett, Dr. Isador H. Coriat, Dr. Leolia Dalrymple, Dr. Helene Deutsch, Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman (Chairman), Dr. John M. Murray, Dr. Jenny Waelder.

Number of Candidates : In preparatory analysis : 8. Under supervision : 16. Total enrolment : 24.

Seminars and Courses : Dr. Helene Deutsch : Technical Seminars.—Dr. Hanns Sachs : Practical Exercises in the Technique of Interpretation.—Dr. Jenny Waelder, Mrs. Beata Rank : Seminar on Child Analysis.—Dr. John M. Murray : Dream Interpretation.—Dr. Robert Waelder : Selected Problems in Psychoanalysis.

Extension School : Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman, Dr. John M. Murray : Seminar for Social Workers.—Dr. William G. Barrett, Dr. Florence Clothier, Dr. Jenny Waelder : Seminar on Pedagogy.

Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman.

Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. Franz Alexander, Dr. Leo H. Bartemeier, Dr. N. Lionel Blitzsten, Dr. Thomas M. French (Chairman), Dr. Helen V. McLean.

Number of Candidates : In preparatory analysis : 15. Conducting case work under supervision : 36. Total enrolment : 51.

Lectures and Seminars : Dr. Therese Benedek : Freud's Papers on Technique.—Dr. Franz Alexander, Dr. Thomas M. French : Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Psychiatric Cases.—Dr. Martin Grotjahn, Dr. Helen V. McLean, Dr. Margaret W. Gerard : Review of Psychoanalytic Literature.—Dr. Leon J. Saul, Dr. Thomas M. French : Practice in Dream Interpretations.—Dr. Thomas M. French : Psychoanalytic Theory of the Drives.—Structure of the Personality.—Problems of Dream Psychology.—Dr. Therese Benedek : Systematic Presentation of the Psychoanalytic Technique.—Dr. Catherine Bacon : Special Problems of Female Psychology.—Dr. Therese Benedek, Dr. Franz Alexander : Clinical Conferences.

Extension School : Dr. George J. Mohr, Dr. Margaret W. Gerard : Problems of the School Child.—Dr. Edwin R. Eisler, Dr. Leon J. Saul : Psychoanalysis and Social Work.—Dr. Franz Alexander, Dr. Thomas R. French, Dr. Margaret W. Gerard, Dr. Therese Benedek, Dr. Helen V. McLean, Dr. George J. Mohr, Dr. Leon J. Saul : Psychological Problems in General Medicine.—Dr. Leon J. Saul : Psychoanalytic Contributions to Sociology.—Dr. Martin Grotjahn : Wit and Humor.—Dr. Robert Waelder (by invitation) : Disintegration of Groups.

Dr. Franz Alexander.
Dr. Thomas M. French.

New York Psychoanalytic Institute

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. Samuel Atkin, Dr. Sara A. Bonnett, Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie, Dr. Philip R. Lehrman, Dr. Sandor Lorand, Dr. Lillian D. Powers, Dr. Sandor Rado, Dr. Adolph Stern, Dr. J. H. W. van Ophuijsen, Dr. Fritz Wittels, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (Chairman).

Number of Candidates : In preparatory analysis : 41. Conducting case work under supervision : 65. Total enrolment : 106.

Lectures and Seminars : Dr. Clara Thompson : Required Readings in Psychoanalysis.—Dr. René Spitz (by invitation), Dr. J. H. W. van Ophuijsen : Basic Data and Methods of Psychoanalysis.—Dr. Gregory Zilboorg : The Neuroses, the Psychoses and Transference Problems in Psychiatric Practice.—Dr. Bertram D. Lewin : Advanced Course in Interpretation and Technique.—Dr. Adolph Stern, Dr. Ruth Mack Brunswick, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg : Freud's Case Histories.—Dr. Adolph Stern : Seminar on the Study of Freud's Writings on Technique.—Dr. George E. Daniels : Seminar on the Discussion of the Material of Required Reading.—Dr. Sandor Rado : Egology.—Dr. Karen Horney : A Critical Evaluation of Certain Psychoanalytic Concepts.—Dr. Géza Róheim (by invitation) : Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Culture.—Dr. David M. Levy : Experimental Study of Children's Responses to Genital Differences.—Clinical Conferences conducted by : Dr. Lillian Malcove ; Dr. Sara A.

Bonnett and Dr. Bertram D. Lewin ; Dr. Bertram D. Lewin ; Dr. Ruth Mack Brunswick ; Dr. Fritz Wittels ; Dr. J. H. W. van Ophuijsen ; Dr. Sandor Lorand ; Dr. Sandor Rado ; Dr. A. Kardiner.

Extension School : Dr. I. T. Broadwin : The Application of Psychoanalysis to Social Work.—Dr. Richard L. Frank : Psychoanalytic Thinking in Case Work.—Dr. Edward Liss : Some Psychoanalytic Contributions to Educational Practices.

Courses given by the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Society under the auspices of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute : Dr. Sydney G. Biddle : Seminar on the Interpretation of Dreams. Dr. Robert Waelder (Boston) : Seminar on Ego Psychology.

Dr. Samuel Atkin.

Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. Sydney G. Biddle (Chairman), Dr. O. Spurgeon English, Dr. LeRoy M. A. Maeder, Dr. George W. Smeltz, Dr. Lauren H. Smith.

Courses offered by the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Society in the academic year 1938–1939 were : Dr. LeRoy M. A. Maeder : Theory of Instincts, Sexual Theory.—Ego Psychology.

Topeka Psychoanalytic Society

(Under the auspices of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis)

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. Robert P. Knight, Dr. Karl A. Menninger (Chairman), Dr. Ernst Simmel.

Number of Candidates : In preparatory analysis : 10. Conducting case work under supervision : 6. Total enrolment : 16.

Seminars and Courses : Dr. Robert P. Knight : Case Seminar.—Dr. Edoardo Weiss : Dream Seminar.—Dr. Ernest Lewy, Dr. Mary O'Neil Hawkins, Dr. Karl A. Menninger, Dr. Robert P. Knight, Dr. Edoardo Weiss : Literature Seminar.

Dr. Robert P. Knight.

Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society

1939–1940

Educational Committee : Dr. Lucile Dooley, Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Dr. Ernest E. Hadley, Dr. Lewis B. Hill (Chairman), Dr. William V. Silverberg, Dr. Edith Weigert-Vowinckel.

Number of Candidates : In preparatory analysis : 6. Conducting case work under supervision : 10. Total enrolment : 16.

Courses and Seminars : Dr. Ralph Crowley : Basic Literature.—Dr. Amanda Stoughton : Basic Literature.—Dr. Dexter M. Bullard : Periodical Literature.—Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann : Interpretation of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Psychotic Productions.—Dr. Edith Weigert-

Vowinckel : The Technique of Psychoanalysis.—Guest Speakers (monthly Round Table presentations) : Non-Clinical Psychoanalysis.—Dr. Lucile Dooley, Dr. Edith Weigert-Vowinckel : Clinical Conferences.

Dr. Lewis B. Hill.
Dr. Dexter M. Bullard.

British Psycho-Analytical Society

1939–1940

Number of Candidates : Owing to the outbreak of war the work of many candidates was interfered with and in October, 1939, 7 candidates had to suspend training ; 1 of these resumed in February, 1940 ; 1 was passed for practice in December, 1939 ; 2 candidates resigned. Five candidates were accepted for training and began their work ; 3 candidates were accepted but were unable to begin training ; 2 candidates were advanced to treatment under control ; 3 candidates were passed for adult practice, Miss Gwen M. Evans, Dr. Elisabeth R. Geleerd, Dr. D. N. Hardcastle.—*June* 30, 1940. Eleven candidates in active adult training (7 in analysis, 4 taking cases under control). In child training : 2.

Owing to war conditions no *Lectures* were arranged during the year. Practical and Theoretical *Seminars* were held by Dr. G. Bibring in the autumn and Miss Anna Freud in the spring. Other seminars arranged for the summer session had to be cancelled.

Training Committee : Dr. G. Bibring, Dr. M. Brierley, Miss A. Freud, Dr. E. Glover (Chairman), Mrs. M. Klein, Dr. S. M. Payne, Dr. J. Rickman, Miss E. F. Sharpe, Mr. J. Strachey.

The presence of 3 Training Analysts in Manchester and Liverpool, i.e. Dr. Bálint, Dr. O. Isakower and Dr. S. Isakower made it possible to arrange for the training of candidates in that area. It was decided to add Dr. Gross' name to this group.

Dr. S. M. Payne.

Indian Psycho-Analytical Society

1940

Number of Candidates : In training : 4, of whom 2 engaged in control work.

Training and Control Analysts : Dr. G. Bose, Lt.-Col. O. Berkeley-Hill, Mr. M. N. Banerji, Mr. H. P. Maiti, Dr. E. G. Servadio, Mrs. Edith Ujvari-Gyomroi. *Training Analysts :* Dr. S. C. Mitra, Mr. K. L. Shrimali.

Lectures : Dr. G. Bose (weekly class) : Case Histories ; The Technique of Psycho-Analysis.—Dr. N. De, Dr. S. N. Banerji, Dr. S. C. Laha, Dr. K. Mukherji, Dr. N. Chatterji : Clinical lectures for the D.P.H. students.—Mr. H. P. Maiti, Dr. S. C. Mitra : Lectures on Mental Disease and Mental Hygiene to the D.P.H. students of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health.—Mrs. E. Ujvari-Gyomroi : Technique of Psycho-Analysis

(for advanced students). Psycho-Analysis and Sexology (for teachers). Child Psychology in connection with the Problems of Everyday Life (parents' class).—Public Lectures in Bengali: Dr. G. Bose: Mental Disease and its Remedy.—Dr. B. Ghosh: Mental Deficiency.—Dr. S. C. Laha: Anxiety.—Dr. S. N. Banerji: Influence of Heredity on Mental Disease.

III. CLINIC REPORTS

Budapest (1939). New applications 51 (Adults: M. 13, F. 23. Children: M. 9, F. 6). Cases in treatment 49 (Adults: M. 16, F. 31. Children: M. 2). Waiting treatment: 50 (Adults: M. 30, of whom 6 put again on waiting list after treatment had been interrupted; F. 20, of whom 8 put again on waiting list after treatment had been interrupted).

Results of treatment of cases completed in 1939

	M.	F.
Cured	1	3
Improved	2 (1 child)	3
Unimproved	6 (1 child)	3
Temporarily interrupted	—	1
Transferred to private treatment	1 (1 child)	—
	10 (3 children)	10, total 20.

Diagnosis of all cases treated in 1939

	M.	F.
Pathological character	3	6
Depersonalization	2	—
Impotence, disturbances of potency	8	—
Frigidity	—	1
Hysteria	5	25
Obsessional neurosis	5	—
Drug addiction	—	1
Depression	1	—
Schizophrenic	—	1
Epileptic	—	1
Post-encephalitic	1	—
Mixed neuroses	—	1
Pseudologia	2	2
Enuresis	1	—
Without diagnosis	—	3
	28	41, total 69.

Dr. S. Pfeifer.

India (1940). During the year 1940 the Society was busy organizing the mental hospital and clinic at Lumbini Park. This was made possible by the munificent grant by Mr. Rajsekhar Bose of 72 Bakulbagan Road, Calcutta, of the estate called Lumbini Park and premises No. 124 Bediadanga Road, Tiljala P.O., worth about Rs. 20,000. It is intended that the hospital and the clinic should provide facilities for psycho-analytic observation and treatment of mental patients and also for control-analysis.

The out-patient clinic was opened on February 5 and the first in-patient was admitted on April 26, 1940. The out-patient clinic deals with both mental and organic cases. The in-patient clinic is reserved for mental cases.

The total number of attendances at the out-patient clinic during the year was 3,975 of which 148 were mental cases.

The total number of patients receiving treatment at the hospital during the period April 26, 1940 to December 31, 1940, was 12 adults (8 male and 4 female).

Lumbini Park (Mental Hospital) Managing Committee : Dr. G. Bose (President), Mr. M. N. Banerji (Secretary), Mr. Bahadur Singh Singhi, Mr. Abdar Dahaman, Dr. S. C. Laha, Mr. T. C. Sinha. Resident Medical Officer : Dr. S. C. Laha.

IV. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CENTRE FOR PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

1941

Owing to war conditions it has been found necessary to suspend the activities of the Bibliographical Centre for Psycho-Analysis in London. The funds remaining will be held in reserve until resumption of activities is found practicable.